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| Volume 3 2007 pages 187-205 | |
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Client kings and new boundaries: the establishment of the ninth-century Viking kingdoms in England Shane McLeod
AbstractBetween 866 and 874 the Vikings conquered three Anglo-Saxon kingdoms in what came to be known as the Danelaw in England, yet the first of these kingdoms was not settled by Scandinavians until 876, after which they were divided, with Scandinavians settling in roughly half of the former kingdoms. In the interim the conquered kingdoms were ruled by Anglo-Saxon client kings chosen by the Vikings. The role of these client kings is rarely examined in works dealing with this period, and this paper will suggest some reasons why the Vikings decided to use client kings, as well as the rationale behind dividing the conquered territory upon settlement. The written sources will be used to assess what the great army expected of its client kings, and also to examine in what areas the great army campaigned prior to settlement, while the archaeological record will be used to examine possible boundary markers used upon settlement. I argue that this particular group of Vikings arrived in England with clear objectives, including utilising the Anglo-Saxon administrations of the conquered kingdoms to its own ends, and the division of the conquered territory to create a Scandinavian settlement zone.
Sometime between 886 and 890 Alfred, the Anglo-Saxon king of Wessex, and Guthrum, the Scandinavian king of East Anglia, concluded a peace treaty that effectively divided England in two, recognising the political reality of the Scandinavian conquest and settlement of the Anglo-Saxon kingdom of East Anglia, and parts of Northumbria and Mercia.1 Although Viking bands were successful in conquering and settling other parts of Europe, the initial use of Anglo-Saxon client kings in England was unique, and this provides some valuable clues to the objectives of the micel here, commonly referred to as the great army, that arrived in England in late 865.2 The actions of the great army suggest that these objectives had been decided upon from the outset of the campaign and appear to have included the creation of a specific area of Scandinavian settlement.
There are a number of examples whereby Vikings either conquered or were granted an area and then established some form of permanent presence and proceeded to rule over the local population. Perhaps the most famous example was the granting of an area of northern Francia to Rollo in 911, leading to the dukedom of Normandy.3 Earlier, Frankish kings had also granted control of Frisia to Vikings on more than one occasion.4 Even more extreme than the granting of land to Vikings is the Russian Primary Chronicle's claim that Riurik and his brothers were actually invited by the local Slav population in the ninth century to rule over them.5 Vikings also forcibly took control of coastal areas of Ireland but were never successful in establishing permanent control over a substantial hinterland.6 However, Vikings were successful in this respect in the Scottish Isles and north-east Caithness on the Scottish mainland,7 as well as on the Isle of Man.8 Vikings also conquered Brittany in the early tenth century and maintained control of it for roughly 20 years, but there appears to have been no effort to establish either trade or settlements in the area.9 In all of these examples the Vikings appear to have personally ruled their newly acquired territory immediately.
Yet the Scandinavian kingdoms in England appear to have been established in a completely different way, with Anglo-Saxon client kings appointed to rule in the Vikings' absence. The apparently unique decision by a Viking army to establish client kings in England instead of taking control of its new territory immediately suggests that the aims of the great army were different from those of the Vikings when gaining control over other territories, which is all the more unusual as there is evidence that members of the great army had campaigned elsewhere before descending upon England.10 This evidently meant that the great army was not content to use a conquered area as a base to attack other kingdoms and to expand its territory, as for example the Vikings of Dublin and Normandy did. Although it could be argued that England was too large to conquer from a single captured area, this in itself indicates that the conquest of a substantial part of England was probably the goal of the great army from the outset. While the great army should not be thought of as a homogenous group, with the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle providing examples of it both breaking up and being supplemented,11 it appears evident from its initial actions that the leadership of the great army arrived in East Anglia with the clear intention of conquering and gaining political control of some of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms. Once the great army forced East Anglia into submission, which included the provision of the horses necessary to its campaign, its first act was to occupy York and subsequently conquer Northumbria and establish a client king on its throne.12 This strategy of conquest and the use of client kings was continued until the final portion of the great army began to settle in 879, despite some changes in leadership. Furthermore, as will be discussed, the division of the kingdoms may have been planned soon after they were conquered, long before they were settled.
The establishment of client kingsNorthumbria fell to the great army following the capture of York on All Saints day 866.13 Following an unsuccessful attempt by the Northumbrians to re-take York in March 867,14 the great army harried Northumbria as far north as the river Tyne before moving to Nottingham in Mercia.15 Although the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle gives no indication of what happened in Northumbria after the great army left, other sources state that an Anglo-Saxon by the name of Egbert was installed as a client king. The entry in the list of Northumbrian kings from the twelfth-century Series Regum Northymbrensium merely states that 'Afterwards Egbert reigned for six years'.16 However, other northern sources provide further details. The Northumbrian section of the De Primo Saxonum Adventu reports that '[t]he Danes put Egbert in charge, who reigned for five years',17 which accords well with both the Historia Dunelmensis Ecclesiæ and Historia Regum.18
A similar policy was adopted in another of the conquered kingdoms, whilst it is likely to have also happened in East Anglia. Following the seizure of Repton in Mercia in 873 and the flight of its king, Burhred, the great army established Ceolwulf II as king, described as a 'king's thegn'.19 This description of Ceolwulf suggests that he may have been an existing member of the Mercian aristocracy. Although none of the written sources name any Anglo-Saxon kings of East Anglia following the death of king Edmund in 869 at the hands of the great army,20 Oswald and Æthelræd are know from coin issues.21 It has been suggested that these kings ruled East Anglia after Edmund but 'before Scandinavian control was fully established',22 but this is unlikely as it would present a very different scenario from what had already happened in Northumbria and was later to happen in Mercia. Instead, it would appear that they succeeded each other as sub-kings of the kingdom on behalf of the great army.
The importance of these puppet kingdoms to the great army is indicated by the speed with which it responded to a challenge to its rule in Northumbria in 872. Although the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle merely reports that the army went to Northumbria before wintering in Torksey in northern Mercia,23 a later source explains that the client king Egbert and archbishop Wulfhere had been expelled by the Northumbrians.24 This revolt against its authority prompted the great army to make the long journey from London to York to suppress it, presumably delaying any plans which it had had to attempt the conquest of Wessex or Mercia.25 Having installed Ricsig as a new client king at York and recalled Wulfhere,26 the great army then moved to Torksey, which was close enough to York to keep a close watch on developments and quickly respond to any further rebellion. Presumably York was considered to be secure before the great army later moved to Repton. It is significant that the Northumbrian rebellion is the only one recorded, although the existence of the two client kings in East Anglia indicates that the initial king was replaced. Despite Roger of Wendover's claim that the first Northumbrian client king Egbert died of grief after being expelled,27 his death seems far too convenient. It would appear that the great army had little hesitation in replacing an unsuccessful client king.
The advantages of using client kingsFrom the evidence that has been preserved, it seems that part of the reason the great army used client kings was that it was happy for the conquered kingdoms to continue functioning under the Anglo-Saxon administrative system. A good example of this is that the client kings issued their own coinage, a practice continued by the Norse kings once the great army settled, despite the fact that the Scandinavian homelands were not minting coins at this time.28 At least one of the client kings is also known to have issued written charters, another practice unknown in Scandinavia at this time. This suggests that the Viking leaders were happy for the conquered kingdoms to continue to function as they had previously.
There is no indication of what arrangements were made in Northumbria after its conquest, but the fact that not only an Anglo-Saxon king but also archbishop Wulfhere were left in power when the army departed indicates that the Anglo-Saxon administrative apparatus continued despite the demise of the Anglo-Saxon kingdom. This desire to maintain the existing system is even more apparent and remarkable when one considers that after the great army had restored its rule following the Northumbrian rebellion, it not only installed a new Anglo-Saxon client king, but also recalled archbishop Wulfhere, thereby prolonging both the secular and sacred administration of Northumbria.
Fortunately, for Mercia and East Anglia there is some indication of what the great army demanded of its client kings. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle entry for 874 says that the great army
granted the kingdom of Mercia to be held by Ceolwulf, a foolish king's thegn, and he swore them oaths and granted hostages, that it should be ready for them whichever day they might want it, and he himself should be ready with all who would follow him, at the service of the raiding-army.29
The charters and coins issued by Ceolwulf II indicate that the administration of Mercia continued in a seemingly normal way, and the signatures on the charters demonstrate that Mercian churchmen survived the transfer of power and worked with the new king.30 Although there is no indication of what to 'be ready with all who would follow him, at the service of the raiding-army' entailed, it is possible that it could have included military service. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle makes no mention of this, but as the work originated in Wessex, the kingdom that would endeavor to dominate England in the tenth century, it may not have wanted to highlight Anglo-Saxon divisions. In contrast to the silence of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, the early twelfth-century history by Gaimar reports that Northumbrians and Mercians joined the great army in its attack on East Anglia in 869.31
In his late-tenth-century Passio Sancti Eadmundi, Abbo of Fleury provides further details of what the great army expected of its client kings. Abbo says that when the great army arrived in East Anglia in 869, its leader Ivar proclaimed that Edmund'commands that you, who will be reigning under him, share with him your ancient treasures and hereditary wealth',32 and presumably Edmund's successors, Ceolwulf and the Northumbrian kings would also have had to share the wealth and treasures of their kingdoms. However, although the great army may have taken much treasure from its conquered kingdoms, this would not be a reason for installing client kings. The treasure could have been taken easily without their compliance.
Along with treasure, Ivar is also supposed to have asked Edmund to share his hereditary wealth. Whilst there is no indication of what this wealth may have been, it presumably included the king's right to feorm.33 For an army regularly campaigning in hostile territory, having access to food was obviously a crucial consideration, and this logistical necessity may provide part of the reason for which client kings were installed. There is no indication that the collection of feorm stopped when a client king was installed, and this food is likely to have been collected on behalf of the great army as a form of tribute. In relation to client kings, Lesley Abrams asks 'Was such a policy adopted in order to ensure continuity of government, or to harness existing arrangements to new purposes under new leadership?'34 I would argue that it was for both. Needing to feed an army, it would be surprising if the Viking leaders were not extracting as much food from their client kingdoms as possible. Anglo-Saxon kings had developed an efficient way of collecting food from their kingdoms, and by installing new Anglo-Saxon kings the great army was now able to access this food itself.35 Whilst Rollo appears to have personally continued the administrative systems of Normandy,36 by establishing client kings the great army enjoyed the benefits of a kingdom without having to administer it itself, leaving it free to attempt the conquest of other kingdoms.
By establishing client kings the great army not only allowed the existing administrative features to continue for its benefit, but it also provided itself with safe areas to retreat to. A need to regroup, along with easy food supplies, may explain the return to York after the siege at Nottingham in 867,37 as well as the move to Gloucester, Mercia, in 87738 after the army left Wessex following the loss of the fleet.39 Similarly, it is likely that the great army moved to Cambridge on the East Anglian border in 874 as it was in a conquered kingdom, allowing the army to regroup and collect food in a non-hostile location after the departure of Halfdan with part of the army.40 As such, the conquered kingdoms provided the opportunity for some respite from campaigning. Following a season's rest and recuperation the army would then leave the previously conquered kingdom and attempt the conquest of another.
The surviving sources hint at some of the methods used by the great army to ensure that its client kings remained compliant. It appears that when the great army left Northumbria in both 867 and 869 a Norse garrison remained behind, perhaps both to ensure the compliance of Egbert, and to stop others from trying to replace him. Gaimar reports that a Viking garrison was left in York when the great army moved to Nottingham in 867.41 Similarly Abbo of Fleury says that when the Viking leader Ivar left York in 869 for East Anglia, another leader, Ubba, remained behind.42 As it is highly unlikely that one of the leaders of the great army would have remained alone in a recently conquered kingdom, it would appear that some troops remained in Northumbria to watch over this newly won possession. A further incentive for client kings to remain compliant is that it appears that the great army demanded hostages from the new kings. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle reports that on the establishment of Ceolwulf as Mercian client king in 874 he granted hostages to the great army,43 and it is likely that this policy was also adopted with the other client kings. At any sign of insubordination by a client king these hostages are likely to have been executed. Ultimately, if a client king did rebel or was overthrown, the great army would return and replace them, as happened in Northumbria and possibly East Anglia.44
A primary reason why the great army may have decided not to settle and administer a kingdom as soon as one was conquered is that it did not have the manpower required to settle one kingdom and still conquer others. Whilst some Vikings were probably left in the conquered kingdoms to ensure the acquiescence of both client king and local population, this would have entailed far fewer men than would be needed to take over the administration and to settle the rural areas. It is likely that the Anglo-Saxon aristocracy would have been somewhat reassured by the great army's non-intrusive approach, even if they had lost control of their kingdom and much of the kingdom's wealth was now going to the conquerors. If the description of Ceolwulf II as a king's thegn is accurate, then it is possible that the client kings used by the great army were existing members of the aristocracy, possibly rival members of the royal family who essentially became collaborators, ready to benefit from the new political reality.45 Being an existing member of the aristocracy would have helped lend the client king a degree of eligibility, and would allow the administration to continue in a 'normal' way. The aristocracy probably accepted, albeit grudgingly, a known client king and the continuance of the church, whilst no doubt hoping that the great army would be defeated somewhere and not return to enforce its direct rule and settlement. It is interesting to note that the rebellion in Northumbria occurred while the great army was in London, which is almost as far from York as it could possibly be. The Northumbrians presumably hoped that either news of the rebellion would not reach the great army,46 or that the army would not travel back to York to restore its rule. Even after the rebellion, another Anglo-Saxon client king was installed, possibly because installing a Viking as ruler may have required a far greater number of troops to enforce his rule, and these troops were probably essential to the great army's ongoing campaign. Furthermore, Viking leaders were evidently military leaders who needed to remain with the great army to help continue its success.
The division of the conquered territoryThe suggested shortage of Viking troops is also evident in the way that the conquered kingdoms were eventually settled. Although the smallest kingdom, East Anglia, appears to have remained intact, the larger kingdoms of Northumbria and Mercia were partitioned, with Scandinavians settling in roughly half of the former kingdoms. These settlement patterns are clearly discernible on a map of Scandinavian place-name elements in England, thereby confirming the chronicle accounts and the treaty between Alfred and Guthrum (see figure 1). Although the settlements occurred some years after conquest, the campaigns of the great army and the way in which the kingdoms were divided suggest that the great army's leadership may have decided upon the new boundaries, not when the kingdoms were settled, but soon after they were conquered.
Figure 1: area of Scandinavian place names in the Danelaw (shaded area) and the approximate boundaries c 880 47
Following the conquest of Mercia, the great army split in 874, with part of it moving to Cambridge ready to attempt the conquest of the only remaining Anglo-Saxon kingdom, Wessex. The rest of the great army returned to Northumbria with one of its original leaders, Halfdan, based itself on the river Tyne, and raided the Picts and Strathclyde Britons further north.48 The following year the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle reports: 'And that year Halfdan divided up the land of Northumbria; and they were ploughing and providing for themselves',49 which marked the beginning of Scandinavian settlement in Anglo-Saxon England. At settlement, the client king Ricsig died as conveniently as Egbert had previously.50
Although the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle says nothing further about this settlement, the northern sources record that the kingdom was divided in two as 'Egbert II ruled over Northumbria beyond the river Tyne'.51 The kingdom was divided by the convenient natural barrier of the river Tyne, and this division effectively returned Northumbria to its original kingdoms, with Deira south of the river Tyne being controlled by Scandinavians and eventually becoming the kingdom of York, and Bernicia north of the Tyne becoming an Anglo-Saxon earldom centred on Bamburgh.52 The most plausible reason why the great army did not try to settle all of Northumbria is that its leaders realised that they did not have the force to maintain effective control over such a large area.
However, I propose that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that this division of Northumbria may have been intended from the initial conquest in 866. In that year York was captured and in 867 the kingdom was raided only as far north as the Tyne.53 It is likely that this ravaging was done in order to subdue the rural areas of the kingdom. The fact that the great army did not raid beyond the Tyne may indicate that it had no intention of dominating that part of Northumbria. It is also possible that the initial client king Egbert only ruled as far north as the Tyne, with the Historia Dunelmensis Ecclesiæ recording that 'the Danes set up Egbert as king of Northumbria, … over those who lived as far north as the river Tyne, under their [the Danes'] rule'.54 Unfortunately, it does not state who ruled beyond the Tyne. It would appear that in 867 the great army was concerned only with dominating the southern half of the kingdom of Northumbria.
Halfdan's actions in 874 are also instructive. Although the wording of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicleis not specific, it suggests that his portion of the great army raided only north of the Tyne, as the entry states:
Halfdan went with some of the raiding-army into Northumbria, and took winter-quarters on the River Tyne; and the raiding-army conquered that land, and often raided among the Picts and among the Strathclyde Britons.55
As the Picts were situated significantly to the north of the Tyne, and the Strathclyde Britons to the north-west, this suggests that Halfdan raided north of his winter camp on the Tyne, subduing the immediate area and then going further to attack those living beyond northern Northumbria. Not only does this accord with the word order of the entry and the geography, but it would make no sense to speak of 'conquering' southern Northumbria when it was ruled by a client king appointed by the great army.56 Instead it would appear that Halfdan passed through conquered southern Northumbria, and then subdued the previously neglected northern Northumbria before installing Egbert II as ruler there. According to the Historia Regum and Historia Dunelmensis Ecclesiæ, Halfdan's attacks on the area in 874 were so threatening that the monks of Lindisfarne decided to remove the body and relics of Saint Cuthbert in an effort to keep them safe.57 The fact that they had not felt the need to do so when Northumbria was initially conquered in 867 indicates how severe the ravaging must have been. The great army then proceeded to attack others who may have been a threat to the land that Halfdan and his followers were about to settle, with the attacks on the Picts being severe enough to be mentioned in Irish annals.58 That the area north of the River Tyne was neglected until just before the Scandinavian kingdom centred on York was settled suggests that the great army had always intended to settle only southern Northumbria, and only paid attention to the area north of the Tyne prior to settlement in order to ensure that no-one was capable of threatening the army's interests.
The next conquered kingdom to be settled was Mercia, and again there appears to be enough evidence to suggest that the division of the kingdom on an east-west basis had been decided upon long before settlement. Like Northumbria, Mercia was divided with a ruler appointed by the great army placed in control of the portion not settled by the great army, and the division of Mercia may have also been due largely to the availability of settlers.59 The initial agreement with Ceolwulf in 874 as reported in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle makes no mention of dividing the kingdom, only that the great army demanded that 'it should be ready for them whichever day they might want it'.60 That day came in 877 when 'the raiding-army went into the land of Mercia, and some of it they divided up and some they granted to Ceolwulf'.61 Æthelweard adds that the great army ravaged the kingdom and erected 'ategias' (huts or tents) in Gloucester.62 Like Halfdan's subduing of northern Northumbria, the ravaging of Mercia is likely to have been of western Mercia, which Ceolwulf was to be left with, rather than the area that was soon to come under direct Norse control. There would have been little advantage in the great army ravaging the area it was about to settle, with the likely effect that such an action would have on the area's food supplies and surplus, especially as the area appears to have been compliant. Gloucester was in western Mercia and this is the only report of the great army operating so far west. As with Northumbria, the great army is likely to have wanted to subdue any possible opposition in the part of Mercia it was not settling, weakening its soon-to-be Anglo-Saxon neighbour.
Possible boundary markersThe decision to divide Mercia close to Repton may have been both a practical and a symbolic decision. Assuming that the treaty between Alfred and Guthrum c 886-890 represents the original division of Mercia in 877, then it is telling that the burial sites of Heath Wood and Repton are very close to the treaty border of Watling Street, within the Scandinavian settlement zone.63 There was no natural boundary available to help divide east from west Mercia, in which case the Roman road of Watling Street would have been a clearly discernible and well-known feature. Repton and Heath Wood were both visible from the main waterborne entry from Anglo-Saxon Mercia into Norse Mercia, the river Trent. As such, they would have served as additional boundary 'signposts' on the frontier of the new Norse settlement area.
The monastery of Repton, the site of the 873-874 winter camp, is noteworthy not only for being the only great army winter camp to have been located and excavated, but also for the discovery of a mass burial of at least 264 people under a burial mound.64 The excavators and subsequent commentators have assumed that the mass grave at Repton was completed at the time of the 873-874 winter camp,65 yet it is equally possible that the mound was sealed in 877-878 at the time that members of the great army took direct control of eastern Mercia and settled it. Apart from the winter camp itself, the only reason for dating the mass burial to 873-874 was the discovery of five coins in the mass burial, 'four of which were struck no later than c.872, and the fifth of which may belong to 873/4'.66 Even if the fifth coin does belong to 873-874, that does not mean that it could not have been deposited in 877-878. Although some of the bones have been dated to c 800-880, the fact that the bones were completely disarticulated before they were sorted and placed in the mound strongly suggests that the people had died a considerable time before burial.67 Indeed, the radio-carbon dating for the bones ranged from 680-880, so members of the great army can only account for the later bones in the deposit.68 The lack of terminal trauma on the bones in the burial has led to suggestions that the great army suffered an epidemic during its stay in Repton,69 and if this was the case then the years between the deaths in 873-874 and settlement in 877-878 would help to explain the disarticulation of the bones. If the burial was sealed in 873-874, then no members of the great army who died in that campaign, except for the single central burial, could have been included in the deposit unless a method was found to rapidly decompose the bodies to get to the point of disarticulation. It has been suggested that members of the great army who had died in previous campaigns were brought to Repton to be placed in the burial,70 but I suggest that this would be both cumbersome and dangerous for an army still campaigning.
At Heath Wood, Ingleby, 4km away, is another Norse cemetery, comprising 59 barrows on rising ground from which Repton would have been visible. At the site the cremated remains of both humans and animals have been found, along with the remains of various grave-goods including weapons. As the finds are dated to the late ninth or early tenth century,71 these barrows could have also been raised at settlement. Indeed, the use of the overtly non-Christian burial rite of cremation strongly suggests an early date for the site.
Both of these burial places required a large investment of time and effort, suggesting that they had symbolic importance, which in turn suggests that their location was important. If Martin Carver's suggestions regarding the mounds at Sutton Hoo are applied to these burials, then Repton and Heath Wood may have been erected to display 'a change in the relations of power, and of social organization, reflecting the need for a newly-formed upper class to promote its rank' and to promote ethnic identity.72 Both of these issues would have been equally appropriate to the leaders of the newly settled Scandinavians after they had taken political and physical control of eastern Mercia. Burying the war dead involved in the conquest of Mercia in the Mercian royal mortuary chapel at Repton at the time of settlement was a powerful political symbol, whilst the use of cremation barrows at Heath Wood was a clear marker of ethnic identity.73 Furthermore, it is believed that burials were often used to 'define territorial rights in a visible and enduring manner',74 and in this case the choice of burial sites appears to reflect the division of the kingdom. It is interesting to note that in the Norse colony of Iceland most of the tenth-century burials were also placed near boundaries, possibly to define farm ownership.75 Similarly on the Isle of Man there are six prominent Norse burial mounds on farms that, like the mound at Repton, were visible to those approaching the territory by water.76 Once the kingdom was divided, Repton and Heath Wood became prominent and no doubt symbolic markers in the border area between Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon Mercia.77
After the settlement of Mercia, East Anglia was settled by Guthrum and the remaining members of the great army in 879 following their defeat by Alfred of Wessex in 878.78 As it was such a small kingdom, it does not appear to have been divided, and the Anglo-Saxon client king was presumably either disposed of or absorbed into the aristocracy.
With Northumbria and Mercia divided, the areas of these kingdoms remaining in the control of Anglo-Saxons - Bamburgh and western Mercia - were essentially new entities created by the members of the great army who returned to settle the larger kingdoms. In both instances the army appears to have ravaged the portion of the former kingdoms about to be left to the Anglo-Saxons, thereby weakening them, and the Anglo-Saxon leaders of both Bamburgh and western Mercia were placed in power by the great army. Thus it is likely that at least initially these new entities were subservient to the stronger neighbouring Norse settlements, the Kingdom of York and the Five Boroughs. It is telling that after the demise of Ceolwulf II the next named leader of western Mercia, Æthelred, is described as an ealdorman rather than king.79 At some point between the division of Mercia in 877 and the first record of Æthelred as the Mercian leader in 883 the subservience to the Norse had evidently been broken and Æthelred became an ally of Alfred of Wessex.80 Somewhat ironically, the establishment of weakened Anglo-Saxon earldoms rather than strong independent kingdoms would eventually assist the expansion of the house of Wessex.
Apart from some forays into western Wessex, it would appear that the great army completely avoided going further west than Repton or north of the Tyne, apart from the two instances immediately before settlement.81 This strongly suggests that the great army's leaders were trying to establish themselves in the central eastern area of England from the outset of the campaign, perhaps explaining why they may have decided to divide Northumbria and Mercia as soon as they were conquered. If the great army had initially intended to settle all of Northumbria and Mercia it would surely have campaigned and displayed its military strength throughout these kingdoms from the outset, rather than confining itself to the areas of future settlement. The division of Mercia into east and west is telling in this regard. Mercia could be naturally divided into north and south by use of the river Trent, and indeed Mercia had been divided into north and south by use of the Trent in the mid-seventh century following the death of king Penda.82 The great army had used the obvious natural boundary of a river when it earlier divided Northumbria by use of the Tyne, and on settlement the Tees, so the decision not to also divide Mercia by use of a river appears to be significant. The use of Watling Street to divide the kingdom, perhaps augmented by boundary markers such as Repton and Ingleby, rather than the more obvious and divisive river Trent, indicates how determined the great army was to establish itself in eastern England. Part of the reason for creating this enclave of territory may have been the geographical orientation of eastern England towards the Scandinavian homelands, and it is telling that the newly established Scandinavian kingdoms controlled all of the rivers that entered the North Sea. Place-name evidence suggests that eastern England was settled by people from present-day Denmark, so easy access to the North Sea for commercial reasons, as well as possible secondary settlement from Scandinavia, was no doubt considered essential.83
The decision by the leaders of the great army to appoint Anglo-Saxon client kings to rule areas that it had conquered was clearly a deliberate policy which was consistently continued throughout the 13-year campaign. For such a policy to be continued, the Viking leaders must have clearly seen benefits in not settling and ruling the conquered areas immediately, and apart from the desire to conquer more territory, these benefits are likely to have included the continuation of the Anglo-Saxon system of government. It would also appear that the great army was intent on settling in central-eastern England, and therefore it generally avoided campaigning in the far north or west, except in its attempts to conquer Wessex. These factors indicate that the great army arrived in England with very clear objectives, which in turn suggests that it was a well-organised, well-led, cohesive and disciplined group.
AcknowledgementsA condensed version of this article was presented at the 2006 AEMA conference in Melbourne and I would like to thank those in attendance for difficult questions, as well as the ARC Network for Early European Research for providing the funds to allow my participation. I would also like to acknowledge the helpful suggestions of Philippa Maddern and Alexandra Sanmark.
Shane McLeod, School of Humanities (History), University of Western Australia
Notes1 'The treaty between Alfred and Guthrum' ed and trans S Keynes and M Lapidge, Alfred the Great. Asser's 'Life of King Alfred' And Other Contemporary Sources (London, 1983) 171-172. Alfred officially controlled London from 886, which by clause 1 of the treaty is in the Anglo-Saxon zone, and Guthrum died in 890.
2 The Anglo-Saxon Chronicles [ASC] ed and trans M Swanton (London, 2000) 866, 68. ASC references will be given as the year listed in the chronicle, but in my text the actual calendar year will be used. For the dates of the ASC entries during the great army's campaign see M L R Beaven, 'The beginning of the year in the Alfredian Chronicle (866-7) ', English Historical Review 33 (1918) 328-42. The 'A' text of the ASC will be referred to unless otherwise indicated as it is the oldest extant. Swanton's translation will be used as he indicates which parts of an entry belong to which actual year. His text essentially follows an earlier edition of the original text, allowing for easy comparison: Two Saxon Chronicles Parallel: With Supplementary Extracts from the Others I ed and trans C Plummer (Oxford, 1892).
3 D Bates, Normandy Before 1066 (London, 1982) 2.
4 J L Nelson, 'The Frankish empire' 19-47 in P Sawyer (ed), The Oxford Illustrated History Of The Vikings (Oxford, 1997) at p 41.
5 G Vernadsky (ed), A Source Book for Russian History from Early Times to 1917, Vol 1 (Yale, 1972) 15. This entry in the eleventh-century chronicle is clearly a fable written to legitimise the rule of the Viking Rus who had probably taken power by force of arms.
6 For an overview of the place-name evidence see G Fellows-Jensen, 'Scandinavian settlement in the British Isles and Normandy: what the place-names reveal' 137-147 in J Adams and K Holman (ed), Scandinavia and Europe 800-1350: Contact, Conflict, and Coexistence (Turnhout, 2004) at p 141.
8 See generally D M Wilson, The Viking Age in the Isle of Man: the archaeological evidence (Odense, 1974).
9 N Price, 'Western Europe' 122-147 in J Graham-Campbell (ed), Cultural Atlas of the Viking World (Oxford, 1994) at p 146.
10 It is thought that the Ivar of English sources is the same as the Imhar in the Irish Annals of Ulster who was active in Ireland before 865 and again between 871 and his death in 873, but is not mentioned between 865 and 870: A P Smyth, Scandinavian Kings in the British Isles, 850-880 (Oxford, 1977) 127-142, 154-188, 195-213, 224-239. For possible numismatic evidence that members of the great army had campaigned in Francia in the early 860s see A P Smyth, King Alfred the Great (Oxford, 1999) 19.
11 ASC, 871, 72; 875, 72-74; 878, 74-76; 879, 76. It is difficult to determine the size of the great army, however the fact that coin hoard deposits peak between 865 and 875 indicates a great deal of uncertainty within England during the great army's campaign, and suggest that this army was larger than those which came immediately before and after it: H R Loyn,The Vikings in Britain (London, 1977) 57. Although the reasons behind the burial of any individual coin hoard are impossible to determine, such a large number of hoards at this time is surely significant. This is particularly true of hoards whose dates and locations correspond to the winter camps at Reading (870-871), Repton (873-874), Gloucester (877), Chippenham (878), and Cirencester (878-879). See M Biddle and J Blair, 'The Hook Norton hoard of 1848: a Viking burial from Oxfordshire?', Oxoniensia 52 (1987) 186-195. Furthermore, the comparative lack of activity on the continent during the great army's campaign suggests that much of the Viking activity was focussed on England during this period: N P Brooks, 'England in the ninth century: the crucible of defeat', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 29 (1979) 1-20 at p 8.
13 November 1. The date is provided in Symeon of Durham, 'Historia Dunelmensis Ecclesiæ; Libri I-IV' 17-135 in T Arnold (ed), Symeonis Monachi Opera Omnia I (London, 1882) at p 55. Although this work was not completed until c 1104-1109 it is believed to have used notices of events north of Wessex from a now-lost northern chronicle. For more on the northern chronicle see P H Blair, 'Olaf the White and the three fragments of Irish annals' 1-27, 34-35 in P H Blair, Anglo-Saxon Northumbria (London, 1984) at p 22-23; C Hart, 'Byrhtferth's Northumbrian chronicle', English Historical Review 97 (1982) 558-582.
14 Symeon of Durham, 'Historia Dunelmensis Ecclesiæ', 55.
15 The harrying of Northumbria is reported in Symeon of Durham, 'Historia Dunelmensis Ecclesiæ', 55; Symeon of Durham, 'Historia Regum' 3-283 in T Arnold (ed), Symeonis Monachi Opera Omnia II (London, 1885)at p 105. Although commonly attributed to Symeon, the latter is a twelfth-century compilation of earlier works, to the extreme that the events of 848-1118 are actually repeated, so the information obviously comes from at least two different sources: see P H Blair, 'Some observations on the Historia Regum attributed to Symeon of Durham' 63-118 in Blair, Anglo-Saxon Northumbria at p107-110. The move from York to Nottingham is given in all sources, including the ASC (868, 68).
16 Postea regnavit Egbert 6 annis (all translations of Latin quotes are mine): 'Series Regum Northymbrensium' 389-393 in Arnold, Symeonis Monachi Opera Omnia II, at p 391.
17 præfecerunt Dani Egbertum, qui regnavit v. annis, 'De Primo Saxonum Adventu' 365-384 in Arnold, Symeonis Monachi Opera Omnia II, at p 377.
18 'the Danes set up Egbert as king of Northumbria' (regem Northumbris qui supererant Egbertum Dani constituerunt), Symeon of Durham, 'Historia Dunelmensis Ecclesiæ', 55; 'after this Egbert truly ruled over Northumbria' (Egbertus vero regnavit post hæc super Northumbros); Symeon of Durham, 'Historia Regum', 106.
19 ASC, 'E', 874, 73. All ASC texts, as well as Asser, name Ceolwulf except ASC 'A'.
21 M Dolley, Viking Coins of the Danelaw and of Dublin (London, 1965) 16.
22 M Blackburn, 'Expansion and control: aspects of Anglo-Scandinavian minting south of the Humber' 125-142 in J Graham-Campbell, R Hall, J Jesch, and D N Parsons (ed), Vikings and the Danelaw. Select Papers from the Proceedings of the Thirteenth Viking Congress (Oxford, 2001) at p 127.
23 Blackburn, 'Expansion and control', 72.
24 Symeon of Durham, 'Historia Dunelmensis Ecclesiæ', 55-6.
25 It is about a 340-kilometres journey. It has been estimated that if a horse carrying a rider was to make more than a one day journey, it could only travel 50 kilometres per day, so this represents at least a one week journey: see C Gillmor, 'War on the rivers: Viking numbers and mobility on the Seine and Loire, 841-886', Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies 19 (1988) 79-109, at p 105.
26 The reign of Ricsig is given as 'Ricsig reigned for two years' (Ricsi duobus annis) in 'Series Regum Northymbrensium', 391, and is also noted in 'De Primo Saxonum Adventu', 377; Symeon of Durham, 'Historia Dunelmensis Ecclesiæ', 56; Symeon of Durham, 'Historia Regum', 111.
27 Roger of Wendover, Roger of Wendover's Flowers of History: Comprising the History of England from the Descent of the Saxons to A.D. 1235 ed and trans M Paris and J A Giles (London, 1849) 209. Egbert's death is also noted in: Symeon of Durham, 'Historia Regum', 111.
28 However, coins had been issued briefly in what is now Denmark earlier in the century: E Roesdahl, The Vikings trans S M Margeson and K Williams (London, 1998) 113.
30 For a charter, see D Whitelock (ed), English Historical Documents 1c. 500-1042 (London, 1955) number 95, 491. For coins see F M Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England ( Oxford, 1971) 252 note 1.
31 G Gaimar, Lestorie Des Engles: Solum La Translacion Maistre Geffrei Gaimar II, line 2861-2866 ed and trans C T Martin and T D Hardy (London, 1889) 92. Smyth sees no difficulty in both Northumbrian and Mercian levies accompanying the great army in its attack on East Anglia: Smyth, Scandinavian Kings, 201. Although Gaimar's work, written c 1135-1147 (ix) contains some clear mistakes, he also has knowledge of events, some corroborated by other writers, not mentioned in the ASC and such additions usually concern the Danelaw (Martin and Hardy, xxxi). As well as northern sources, Gaimar also speaks of using the otherwise unknown History of Winchester, chronicles ordered by King Alfred and kept chained up to be read in Winchester Cathedral (Gaimar, line 2331-2340, 76), quite possibly an early version of the ASC (Martin and Hardy, xxiii). Gaimar appears to have had access to important sources no longer extant, and therefore cannot be easily dismissed. Indeed, all historians have accepted his naming of Ubba as the Viking leader who attacked Devon in 878.
32 mandat ut cum eo antiques thesaurus et paternas divitias sub eo regnaturus dividas: Abbo of Fleury, 'Passio Sancti Eadmundi' 3-25 in T Arnold (ed), Memorials of St. Edmund's Abbey I (London, 1890) at p 11. Abbo wrote his work during his two-year stay in England, c 985-987. In a dedicatory letter to Dunstan, archbishop of Canterbury, Abbo explains that he heard the story of St Edmund's martyrdom from Dunstan, who in turn had heard it as a boy from an old man who claimed to have been with Edmund on the day of his death (Abbo of Fleury, 3-5). From this we can assume that his account of the events surrounding Edmund's death is largely faithful to the story which Dunstan had told him.
33 The feorm (food rent) was the amount in kind owed by landowners for the support of the royal household, and this produce was delivered to the local royal estate. For example, it is known that Chippenham was a collection point for feorm by the time of Domesday Book: H R Loyn, The Governance of Anglo-Saxon England 500-1087 (London, 1984) 95. For the amount of feorm demanded of the estate of Westbury during the reign of Offa, see Whitelock, English Historical Documents I, number 78, 467. It is surely not coincidental that the great army attacked a number of royal estates shortly after harvest during its campaign.
34 L Abrams, 'Edward the Elder's Danelaw' 128-143 in N J Higham and D H Hill (ed), Edward the Elder 899-924 (London, 2001) at p 134.
35 For a further discussion of the issue of feeding the great army see S McLeod, 'Feeding the micel here in England c 865-878', Journal of the Australian Early Medieval Association 2 (2006) 141-156.
36 Bates, Normandy Before 1066, 11-12.
38 Æthelweard names Gloucester as the base. Æthelweard, The Chronicle of Æthelweard, ed and trans A Campbell (London, 1962) 42. Ealdorman Æthelweard, whose signatures run from 973-998 (Æthelweard, xv) was related to King Æthelred of Wessex (38) and used an early version of the ASC for his chronicle (xxxii).
39 It is reported that a fleet of 120 ships (likely to be an exaggeration) was lost in a storm off the southern coast of Wessex: ASC, 877, 74.
41 Gaimar, line 2839-2840, 91.
42 Abbo of Fleury, 9. Although a hagiographical intent from both Abbo and Dunstan is likely, and is especially evident in the account of events following Edmund's martyrdom, there is no apparent reason to invent the story of Ubba remaining in Northumbria.
44 If the initial East Anglian client king was replaced then it may have happened in 874 when the army moved to Cambridge. As in 873 when it moved to Torksey, Cambridge was in the border area between two kingdoms, close enough to respond to any problems, and also close to Wessex, the next kingdom to be attacked.
45 For a suggestion that Ceolwulf II was from a rival Mercian dynasty see I W Walker, Mercia and the Making of England (Stroud, 2000) 39. The ASC records that Northumbria had two rival kings when the great army arrived in late 866: ASC, 867, 68.
46 The fact that the great army did learn of the rebellion is testimony to its good lines of communication.
47 After J Haywood, The Penguin Historical Atlas of the Vikings (London, 1995) 63 and 79.
50 Echoing his account of the earlier death of Egbert, Roger of Wendover reports that Ricsig died of a broken heart when Halfdan settled: Roger of Wendover, 209. The 'Historia Regum' merely records that he died: 'Rex Ricsig Northanhymbrorum moritur', 111.
51 secundus Ecbertus regnat super Northumbros ultra amnem Tynæ: 'Historia Regum', 111. Egbert's reign is also recorded in the 'Series Regum Northymbrensium', 391, and the 'De Primo Saxonum Adventu', 377.
52 For Bamburgh see Æthelweard, 53. Although the Scandinavians ruled an area up to the Tyne, the place names suggest that they mainly settled only as far north as the River Tees.
53 'Historia Regum', 105-106; 'Historia Dunelmensis Ecclesiæ', 55.
54 regem Northumbris qui supererant Egbertum Dani constituerunt, … qui ad septentrionalem plagem fluminis Tini habitabant, sub eorum domino imperaret: 'Historia Dunelmensis Ecclesiæ', 55.
56 The word order given in Swanton's translation does match the original text: See Plummer, Two Saxon Chronicles, 875, 72-74.
57 'Historia Regum', 110; 'Historia Dunelmensis Ecclesiæ', 56. The community eventually settled at Durham, where the relics can still be seen.
58 'The Picts encountered the dark foreigners in battle, and a great slaughter of the Picts resulted': The Annals of Ulster, U875.3, available online at CELT: The Corpus of Electronic Texts http://www.ucc.ie/celt/published/T100001A/ [10 October 2006]. The fact that both The Annals of Ulster and the ASC recorded these attacks in the north of Britain, far from where the chronicles were compiled, indicates how severe the attacks must have been.
59 As happened with the settlement of Northumbria, enough men had to be left for the great army to continue to campaign against Wessex.
63 'The treaty between Alfred and Guthrum', 171.
64 M Biddle and B Kjølbye-Biddle, 'Repton and the "great heathen army", 873-4' 45-96 in J Graham-Campbell, R Hall, J Jesch and D N Parsons (ed), Vikings and the Danelaw. Select Papers from the Proceedings of the Thirteenth Viking Congress (Oxford, 2001).
65 For example, see: J Richards, 'Boundaries and cult centres: Viking burial in Derbyshire' 97-104 in Graham-Campbell, Hall, Jesch, and Parsons, Vikings and the Danelaw, at p 100.
66 Biddle and Kjølbye-Biddle, 69: my emphasis.
67 Biddle and Kjølbye-Biddle, 79-80.
68 Biddle and Kjølbye-Biddle, 78-79, 87-92.
69 S Keynes, 'The Vikings in England, c. 790-1016' 48-82 in P Sawyer (ed), The Oxford Illustrated History of the Vikings (Oxford, 1997) at p 55; N Price, 'Western Europe'122-147 in J Graham-Campbell (ed), Cultural Atlas of the Viking World (Abingdon, 1994) at p 128; E Roesdahl, The Vikings (London, 1998) 238.
70 Biddle and Kjølbye-Biddle, 79-80.
71 J D Richards, M Jecock, L Richmond and C Tuck, 'The Viking barrow cemetery at Heath Wood, Ingleby, Derbyshire', Medieval Archaeology 39(1995-1996) 51-70: dating at p 60.
72 M Carver, 'Reflections on the meanings of monumental barrows in Anglo-Saxon England' 132-143 in S Lucy and A Reynolds (ed) Burial in Early Medieval England and Wales (London, 2002) at p 135.
73 For the mortuary chapel see: Biddle and Kjølbye-Biddle, 50.
74 B Ringstad, 'Graves and ideology. Implications from western Norway in the migration period' in J Ringtved (ed), Samfundsorgansiation og regional variation: Norden i romersk jernalder og folkevandringstid: beretning fra 1 Nordiske jernaldersymposium på Sandbjerg Slot 11-15 April 1989 (Højberg, 1991) 150. For example, Sutton Hoo was placed in a prominent position at the maritime entrance of the kingdom: Carver, 'Reflections on the meanings of monumental barrows', 139.
75 A Friðriksson, 'The topography of iron age burials in Iceland' in G Guðmundsson (ed), Current Issues in Nordic Archaeology: Proceedings of the 21st Conference of Nordic Archaeologists 6-9 September 2001, Akureyri, Iceland (Reykjavík, 2004) 16.
76 Richards, 'Boundaries and cult centres', 98.
77 For a similar view on the significance of these burials, albeit with a different emphasis see Richards, 'Boundaries and cult centres', 97-102.
79 For example see Whitelock, English Historical Documents I, number. 99, 498.
80 For more on Æthelred see Walker, Mercia and the Making of England, 75-76.
81 The ASC records five incursions by the great army into Mercia: Nottingham in 867-868, London in 871-872, Torksey in 872, Repton 873-874, and then again in 877. Apart from Gloucester, these locations were all very much in eastern Mercia, except for Repton in the centre. In Northumbria there is no record of the great army campaigning further west than York, although it may be assumed that the harrying in 866/867 included central Northumbria. The place name evidence also indicates that the great army settlers only settled eastern and central-southern Northumbria, and eastern Mercia: see figure 1.
82 Bede, A History of the English Church and People III.24, trans L Sherley-Price, (Harmondsworth, 1968) 185.
83 For a discussion of 'Danish' and 'Norwegian' place names in England see G Fellows-Jensen, 'In the steps of the Vikings' 279-288 in Graham-Campbell, Hall, Jesch and Parsons, Vikings and the Danelaw.