Ladies and Gentlemen.

It gives me a great pleasure to be with you and to discuss over the Macedonian Question. I realise very well your sensitivity on this issue. In the last years your concern about the developments on the Balkan Peninsula and especially the fate of Greek Macedonia reached its peak, as your demonstrations showed. But the question arises, why our struggle did not yield the expected results, why Gligorov is not willing to abandon the name Macedonia and what should have been our attitude, in order that we could have reached better results. Things are not so simple, as they seem to be at first glance. To understand the Macedonian Question, one should consider it in a interbalkan contex. The purpose of this lecture is to clarify the terms Macedonia and Macedonian Question from a historical point of view, to outline the current developments and to make some speculations about the gist of the Macedonian Question in the future, as far as it could be possible.

Macedonia is a geographic term, which in the antiquity included initially Pieria and Bottiaea. In the fifth century the Macedonian King, Alexander I, extended Macedonia s borders eastwards to the river Strymon, taking territory from neighbouring barbarian tribes and imposed his domination over Hellenic tribes to the north (Upper Macedonia). Durings Philip II s reign (359-336 BC) , with the incorporation of Paeonia, the borders of the macedonian state were pushed back as far as Dardania, the capital of which was Scupi, modern Skopje. Under Roman rule, the administrative centres of the province of Macedonia (established in 148 BC) were Thessaloniki, Amphipolis, Pella and Pelagonia. The borders of historical Macedonia included only a part of what is now the Former Yugoslav Republik of Macedonia (the broader area of Monastir and Strumitsa). Only what is now the Greek part of Macedonia may be considered to be representative of ancient, historical Macedonia. The fact that the ancient Macedonians were indeed Greeks is attested by historical sources, linguistic evidence and archaeological finds, all of wich link the region of Macedonia with the Greeks from Mycenaean times onwards. Certain political agents hostile attitude to the ancient Macedonians was due to the differences between the political systems of southern Greece and Macedonia (the latter shared neither the institution of the city-state nor that of democracy) and to the southerns fear of the imposition of a monarchy. Demosthnenes aggressiveness towards Philip was also due to the fact that Athens was losing not only its colonies to the expanding Macedonian state, but also its access routes to the breadbasket of Thrace. The Macedonians followed Greek ideologie (as expressed by Agesilaus and Isoctates) by uniting the politically fragmented Greeks and the outcome of Alexander s campaign was the diffusion of Hellenic culture throughout the east and the birth of the Hellenistic word. Not only was Macedonia the greek bastion against the barbarians , it was also a integral part of Greece.

In the early Byzantine era the term "Macedonia" had a purely administrative significance, for Macedonia was part of Illyricum. An from 800 onwards the theme of Macedonia included Thrace. But there was never a slavonic tribe, called "Macedonians". It is important to know that, even when the Byzantine writers applied ancient ethnomys, which were of only geographical significance in their own time, to the new tribes that were penetrating into the Balkan Peninsula ( the Serbs, for example, are described as Triballi, the Bulgars as Scythians), under no circumstances did they apply the term "Macedonian" to any Slavonic tribe, for it was considered applicable only to Hellenic tribes. The Slavs settlement in the geographical region of Macedonia certainly changed its ethnological make-up. But they never posed a substantial threat to the Empire and were rapidly absorbed by the Empires administrative machinery.

In the second half of the ninth century, the present territory of the FYROM became part of the alraedy slavicised protobulgarian state. Ohrid was the spiritual centre of medieval Bulgaria , for it was there that Cyril and Methodius disciples went after being expelled from Moravia, to continue their task of translating the greek ecclesiastic texts into Church Slavonic using the Glagolitic alphabet. The byzantine Emperor John Tsimisces did conduct a campaign in Preslav and Dorystol and overthrew the protobulgarian state in 971. But the fact that he did not then move into western part of the bulgarian state does not mean that it had not been subjugated by Byzantium. These western regions were part of the protobulgarian state and in 969 the Cometopouli did not establish a "west macedonian state" that had splintered off from the bulgarian state. It was only after Tsimisces death in 976 that Samuel began to reconstruct the medieval bulgarian state, starting with the western privinces. After long, fierce wars,, his kindom was overthrown in 1018 by Basil II of Macedon, who, precisely because he had quelled the rebellious Bulgars and overthrown the bulgarian state, became known as the "Bulgar-slayer".The byzantine sources mention neither a macedonian state ruled by Samuel not macedonian Slavs laying the foundations of such a state. The decline of the bulgarian state permitted the rise of the serbian state, which flourisched briefly under Stefan Dushan. In his time Macedinia was under serbian sway. After his death in 1355 the serbian state collapsed and was succeeded by a number of small serbian principalities.

In the ottoman period the historical area of Macedonia was not a single administrative unit, but lay among three vilayets, those of Monastir, Thessaloniki and Kosovo. The term "Macedonia" was not used by the Ottomans as an administrative one. In the late ninteenieth century "Macedonia" was conventionally used in European diplomacy with reference to the three vilayets. This created a certain amount of confusion, because the three vilayets extended beyond the territory of historical Macedonia and included parts of Old Serbia (Skopje) and North Epirus (Koritza). It is evident that we have to distinguish between the historical Macedonia which becomes identified with what is now the Greek part of Macedonia including a small part of what is now the Former Yugoslav Republik of Macedonia and the term Macedonia in a broader sense which roughly coincides with the Greek, Bulgarian and former Yougoslave part. But it is noticeable that in the ninteenieth century this differenciation was not of account for the european diplomacy and these were no strong reactions against such a misuse of the term "Macedonia", even from the Greek side. The fact remained that everybody used the establisched term Macedonia relating to the broader, convential area.

Since the 18th century the Greek element in Macedonia had had very strong positions. The Greeks flourished in a multitude of ways in the economic, social and educational sectors, thus leading to the complete domination of the area by Greek cultural influence.The ecclesiastical juridiction exercised by the Constantinople Patriarchat after the abolition of the Pec and Ohrid authorities had given the Greeks control over cultural as well as religious matters. These factors explain why the major segments of the slavonic speaking peasants aquired a Greek national awareness and based their hopes of liberation from the turkish yoke chiefly on Grrece. Greece was an independent nation state since 1830 onwards and throughout the Greek War of Independence and the Grimean war the Greeks organised liberation rising on macedonian soil. This Hellenisation could not be counteracted by the notion of Slavomacedonian national consciousness , for there was simply no such a thing. Since there had been no Slavomacedonian state in the past, historical records could not be appealed to for an answer. The Slawophones were largely illiterate and spoke dialects, but also the Greek language (bilinguals). They lost the consciousness of belonging to the other slav peoples and became accustomed to relying on Greece for the improvement of their situation. Had Greece by the mid of the 19 th Century incorporated the whole of Macedonia, would it have had no difficulty in integrating the slavophones within the Greek state.

It is understandable why the foundation of the bulgarian Exarchat in 1870 presented a threat to the Greek cause in Macedonia. By exploiting the factor of language and by invoking medieval history, the Bulgarians were able to wrest Slavophones away from the Greek cultural circle and inculcate in them a bulgarian awareness. The Bulgarians aim was to eradicate the Greek influene in Macedonia, to untermine the positions of the Hellenism and to annex the whole of Macedonia. Consequently, the beginning of the Macedonian Question is closely linked with the bulgarian national awaking and its spread into Macedonia. With the foundation of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) in Thessaloniki in 1893 the Bulgarians were trying by revolutionary means to reach the autonomy of Macedonia as a first step to annexation. Despite the various changes visited upon its name for tactical reasons, IMRO never lost its Bulgarian identity and had close connections with Sofia. Even IMRO s Ilinden Uprising on the 2 of August 1903 was instigated by the Bulgarian government to internationalize the Macedonian Question by stirring up troubles in Macedonia and drawing the attention of European Great Powers to the matter. Since 1881 Serbia had had also claims to Macedonia to offset the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia and Herzegonina. This Greco-Slavic rivarly over Macedonia was the gist of the Macedonian Question in late 19th and early 2o th. After the Bulgarian Ilinden Uprising the Greeks embarked upon the defensive Macedonian Struggle (1904-1908) which was successfully waged. It should not be overlooked that the most Slawophones in the southern areas of Macedonia remained faithfull to Patriarchat and many fought on the Greek side. Their devotion to the Greek national cause led the Bulgarians to call them Grecomans, fanatical Greeks. The Bulgarian influence was strong in the northern areas, whereas the greek positions were strong in the southern .

It must be emphasized that in this period the term Macedonians was used exclusively to refer to the geographic region, it was applicable to all nationalities living in Macedonia (Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks, Albanians). The diplomatic records make no mention of a separate slavomacedonian nation. The Slavophones had no other option than to remain Greeks or to become Bulgarians or Serbs. However, a small group of intellectuals (Dedov, Misaikov, Cupovski, Misirkov), who primarily had been educated in bulgarian schools and afterwards in serbian, made effort to create a purely slavomacedonian nation.The most famous of them was Krste Misirkov. Experiencing the serb-bulgarian rivarly over Macedonia and the perpetuation of turkish authoritarian regime, seeing that Bulgaria could not liberate Macedonia and that Russian policy was not in favour of the revolutionary activities of IMRO, Misirkov, after the failure of the Ilinden Uprising, devised the concept of Slavomacedonianism as a political means of achieving independence for Macedonia within the framework of the Ottoman Empire. He was fully aware that the new ethnicity was a complete fabrication, that there was in fact no such thing as a slavomacedonian ethnicity.

'' Many people will wonder, he wrote in his book on Macedonian Matters (1903), what national fragmentation we are talking about. Can we be thinking of creating a new, Macedonian ethnicity? That would be a fictitious thing and would not last a day. What kind of macedonian ethnicity is this, when our fathers, our grandfathers, and our great grandfathers were called Bulgarians?... There have always been two nationalities in Macedonia; the Bulgarians and the Serbs. A Slavomacedonian rebirth is an empty dream of star gazers who have no idea of the Southern Slavs history."

He waves away these objections with the simple argument: but what does not exist can be created, if the historical circumstances call for it".

Misirkov does not doubt about the artificial character of the Slavomacedonianism. He admitted having acted as a politician. But he considered this option as necessary political means, if the greco- serbo-bulgarian antagonism could not cease to develop to the detriment to the local population and if Bulgaria could not incorporate the whole of Macedonia. In 1903 he advocated the creation of a slavomacedonian standard language, based on the central slavomacedonian dialects. Misirkov used very often the term Macedonian referring to the slavic population. Given the fact that the term "macedonian" included all nationalities living in Macedonia and so there could be a confusion, he uses also the term Slavomacedonian to demonstrate that he refers only to the Slavs. Misirkov had no influence on the population and on the ranks of IMRO. The IMRO was not in favour of a national separatism. Misirkov s book was burnt in Bulgaria. But taking into consideration the developments in yougoslave Macedonia after the Second World War, one can understand why Misirkov is regarded in Skopje as the number one national enlightener.

Macedonia shook off the Ottoman yoke during the victorious Balkan Wars of 1912-13. Since Macedonia never was a historical entity and unity, it is nonsense to talk about a partition, a dismemberment of Macedonia between the imperialistic Balkan states to the detriment of the so called "macedonian" people, as Historians do in Skopje. The fact that Slawoplones with Greek national consciousness fought with the Greek army and Slavophones with Bulgarian national consciousness joined the Bulgarian Armee demonstrates the non existence of "slawomacedonian" national consciousness. It was chiefly the Bulgaro-Macedonian organisations that were agitating for an independent Macedonia after Bulgarians defeat in the Second Balkan War. It is true that after the Balkans Wars Miirkov and some others intellectuals(Cupovski, Konstantinov) appealed through their journal "The Macedonian Voice" to the Slawophones to declare themselves neither as Bulgarians nor as Serbs nor as Greeks, but as Slavomacedonians and to struggle for an independent Macedonia, but they were agitating in Russia and their voice found no recipients. After 1914 they gave up their activities.

As far as Greece concerns, the southern area of Macedonia that went to Greece was almost identical in size with the "historical" Macedonia of the classical period, with the exception of a small strip that remained within the Serbian and Bulgarian territories. This southern zone included, apart from the Greek population, a certain number of Slawophones. Greece and Bulgaria signed in November 1919 a special accord for a mutual exchange of population. The Slavophones in Greek Macedonia who had a developped Bulgarian national consciousness would be allowed to emigrate to Bulgaria, while those who wished to stay(about 160.000) were considered to have Greek national consciousness, as they had remained loyal to the Oecumenical Patriarchat, were to a great extent bilingual and had fought with the Greeks in the Macedonian Struggle. There were some elements with a latent probulgarian orientation, but they did not cause difficulties to the Greek state and remained royal. It is significant that neither the Bulgarian IMRO nor the Communist IMRO (United) exerted much influence on the slawophones in the interwar period. As over 300.000 Moslems left Greek Macedonia for Turkey and 700.000 Greeks from Asia Minor came and settled in Greek Macedonia, the Greek character in Greek Macedonia was indisputable. (1.340.000 Greeks) in 1926). It could be say that the Macedonian Question was solved in he interwar period , as far as Greece concerns.

In the yugoslave part of Macedonia conditions were very different. The overwhelming slav population had probulgarian feelings which had roots stretching back to the late period of Ottoman rule . Belgrad applied a policy of brutal serbianisation of the region , non recognizing the existence of bulgarian minority. For Belgrad the Slawomacedonians were an amorphous mass with fluid national consciousness and could become Serbs. The bulgarian organisation IMRO reacted to this Serbianisation by waging a guerrila war against the Serbs and assassinating Serbs state officials. Consequently, yugoslave Macedonia was a theater of military operations between Bulgarian Comita djis and Serbian Gendarms and an apple of discord between Bulgaria and Serbia. Probulgarian feelings were subsequently sustained by the terrorist activity of IMRO. On the other hand, Belgrad did not take economic and social measures to upgrade the backward area of yugoslave Macedonia and so through modernization to curb the bulgarian irredetism and to pave the way for a successful serbianisation. How the real situation of the miserable peasants in yugoslave Macedonia was, clearly shows a diplomatic record from the year 1930.

"At present the unfortunate Macedonian peasants is between the hammer and anvil. One day "Comitatjis" come to his house and demand under threat lodging, food, and money and the next gendarm hales him off to prison for having given them... The Macedonian is really a peacable , fairly industrious agriculturist and if the S.C.S. Government give him adaquate protection, education, freedom from malaria and decent communication, there seems no reason why he should not become just a Serbian in sentiment as he was Bulgarian ten years ago. But as long as he is harassed by the comitadji one day and the gendarme the next, one cannot expect peace or content".

It is evident that a Macedonian Question had to exist in the Yugoslave part of Macedonia, as long as the policy of Serbianisation was being conducted by brutal means and could not yield tangible results. The existence of a Macedonian Question in Yugoslav Macedonia in the interwar period and the failure of the Serbianisation s policy explain why the Yugoslav Communists discerned in the notion of the "Macedonian nation" an opportunity to make a stand against bulgarian claims on yugoslav Macedonia and to integrate the population within the framework of yugoslav federation. But the notion of a separate "slawomacedonian nation" goes back to the Communist International. There is no point in discussing the Comintern s policy on the Macedonian Question in details. It should be said that the Comintern approached the Macedonian Question not as matter of principle but chiefly as a matter of tacticts, bearing in mind the Soviet Union s foreign-policy strategy. Soviet diplomacy and the Communist International did their best to alienate the Bulgaro-Macedonian organizations from Bulgarian nationalism, talked about a "macedonian people" divided among Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia and pressed for " unified and independent Macedonia in the framework of a Balkan Federation" to untermine the Balkan States.

In Januar 1934 the Communist International passed a resolution recognising the existence of a "Slavomacedonian nation". After Hiltler rose to power and in view of the close contacts between the Bulgarian VMRO and the Nazis, the Soviet Union was anxious to prevent Nazi Germany from exploiting the Macedonian Question to the advantage of the Bulgarian Fascists. For this reason the Balkan Communist parties were asked to take up not only an ideological and political, but also a clearly national struggle on behalf of "macedonism" and to oppose the Bulgarian national idea of the Bulgarian VMRO, which was promoting the slogan of a "unified and independent Macedonia" as a second bulgarian state in the convinction that the ethnic label "bulgarian" was fully compatible with the political label"Macedonian"It is interesting to note that in the Comintern s resolution about the existence of " a macedonian nation", Macedonia was described as a potential theater of war in the impending imperialist war and Bulgaria s right to occupy the bulgarian part of Macedonia and claim to the broader region of Macedonia were disputed.

The most important points in the resolution are as follows.

.".... Macedonia will be one of the seats of the coming imperialist war. The nations which have domination over Macedonia are enforcing a policy of daylight robbery, rabid terrorism and ethnic oppresion... The bourgeoisie of the three imperialist nations among which Macedonia has been divided is endeavouring to conceal the ethnic oppression by denying the national characteristics of the Macedonian people and the existence of a Macedonian nation.The Greek chauvinistis maintain that the local Slav population in the Greek-occupied sector of Macedonia consists of Greeks who were slavicized in past centuries and must be forcibly 'brought back' to Greek culture through the interdiction of the speaking and teaching of their mother tongue. The Great Serbian chauvinists cite the existence of serbian words in the language spoken by the local population as a pretext for declaring this population to be one of the "tribes" of the yugoslav nation and they are subjecting it to forcible serbianization.The Bulgarian chauvinists are exploiting the affinity between the Macedonian and Bulgarian languages to assert that the Macedonians are Bulgarians and trying thus to justify their occupation of the Petritch area and the their expansionist policy throughout Macedonia. Fighting against the division and enslavement of the Macedonian people, against all forms of ethic, cultural, economic and social oppressio, IMRO (United) must reveal the true meaning of all these fallacies which deny the Macedonian people the identity of a nation and not permit these fallacies to penetrate its own circles"..

As already said, the resolution regarding the existence of "a Macedonian nation" was especially favorable to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, since a Macedonian Question really existed in yugoslav Macedonia. The same year (1934) the Communist Party of Yugoslavia decided to establisch a national "macedonian" Communist Party in the future.

But probulgarian feelings among the slav local population were still alive and the bulgarian occupation forces in the serbian part of Macedonia in the Second World War were received as liberators. Neither the Communist s position regarding a separate Macedonian nation nor the idea of a yugoslav federation met with much response from the slav population. There was no Communist Party of "Macedonia" , because it had not been possible to carry out the Yugoslav Communist Party s 1934 decision to form one. It could be formed only in 1943. The local Communists under Metodji Shatorov broke away from the Yugoslav Communist Party and joined the Bulgarian Workers Party , whose slogan was " one state, one party''. But two factors proved favourable for the Yugoslav Communists and the option of the Slawomacedonianism. The subsequent dissatisfaction with the Occupation authorities which was due to social reasons (high -handedness, heavy taxation, contempt for local sensitivities) and the evident defeat of Germany. Bulgaria would be a defeated country and could not fullfil its national dreams, whereas the new Yugoslavia would be a victorious federal state in which the Slawomacedonians were recognised as an equal nation with the other yugoslav peoples and would have their own state. This solution seemed to be attactive and many who had served the bulgarian authorities joined the partisans. From Bulgarian patriots they became Slawomacedonian nationalists. It was the case in yugoslav Macedonia as well as in Greek Macedonia, where Slavophones who either out of self-interest or in response to pressure had become tools of the bulgarian occupiers and organised security corps, known as Ohrana, shed the insignia of the Bulgarian Fascist army and joined the projugoslav SNOF. It is true that the future Yugoslav federation was to include all parts of Macedonia. On 2 August 1944, at the first session of the Partisan-led Antifascist Assembly of National Liberation of Macedonia a "People s Republic of Macedonia" was proclaimed. Its founding manifesto as well as other documents and public pronouncements clearly put forward the unification of all parts of Macedonia. The unification of all sections of Macedonia was presented as the just and constant desire of this new member of the Yugoslav Federation. Skopje was called upon to play the part of Macedonian Piedmond. Efforts had been made to inculcate forcibly with all Slav- Speaking and bilingual inhabitants of Macedonia a slawomacedonian national awareness (now matter if they felt as Greeks or Bulgarians) and to convince them that the real and fair solution of the Macedonian Question consists in the incorporation of the whole of Macedonian within the Yugoslav Federation. In Greek Macedonia the Organisations of the Slawophones SNOF during the Second World War and NOF during the Civil War clearly laid territorial claims to Greece. Hard bulgaro-yugoslav negociations were assumed for the incorporation of Bulgarian Macedonia Under yugoslav and soviet pressure the Bulgarians recognised in 1946 the existence of "a Macedonian nation"but they were reluctant to hand over the Bulgarian part of Macedonia as long as no compensation for a territorial outlet to the Aegean Sea was evident and confined themselves to grant cultural autonomy to the Bulgarian population of Bulgarian Macedonia with a view to changing their awareness from Bulgarian into Slawomacedonian, according to Bled Agreement. After Tito s Cominform split in June 1948 the Bulgarians disvowed this policy and stressed the historical ties between Bulgaria and Macedonia.

It should be said that it was not Skopje s local Government, but the Yugoslav Federal Government which carved out the policy towards the Macedonian Question. Despite the propaganda onslaugt against Greece, Tito was very cautious in his tactical moves towards Greece, because he was contigent upon the british aid. He had to shoulder the responsibility on international level, if his moves had burdened the anglo-soviet relations and afterwards the soviet-american relations. When in December 1944 the Aegaen Brigade wanted to come to Greece to fight with ELAS , Tito forbade it to enter Greece. No document has yet been found confirming that the KKE officially agreed that Greek Macedonia should be ceded to Tito as conditio sine qua non for Yugoslav help during the Greek Civil War, although the Yugoslav leadership did seem to expect that the KKE would repay its help by satisfying its designs on parts of Greek Macedonia. The american fears during the Greek Civil War, Tito could send some yugoslav divisions to seize Thessaloniki, did not come true. There were many animosities between Skopje s authorities and the Yugoslav Federal Goverment. After Tito s rupture with the Cominform in June 1948 and the termination of the Greek Civil war in August 1949 the yugoslav leadership abandoned its plans for a "conclusive" solution of the Macedonian Question and raised only the issue of respect for the rights of the putative "macedonian" minorities in the neighbouring countries.

After 1944 the process of the creation of a" Macedonian Nation" began to take place in yugoslav part to Macedonia. The main purpose was to differenciate the Slawomacedonians from the Bulgarians and to eradicate both serbian and bulgarian influence. The task was difficult, because the Bulgarian consciousness was relatively highly developped in considerable segments of population. The yugoslav authorities broke up all the bulgarian organizations that were opposed to the notion of Macedonianism on an antibulgarian basis. Nowadays, the Bulgarians claim that about 30.000 Bulgarians were killed by the yugoslav secret police from 1944-1950. The statehoood, the creation of a standart language , of a church and of national historiography were basic ingredients for the politics of mutation. Official historiography and social sciences in general were systematically employed in a nation-bulding effort which, however, flagrantly infringed upon the historical legacy and cultural identity of neighbouring nations. The basic goal was to establish the "Macedonian" nation as a historical dogma, dating it neither from the Comintern Resolution or from 1944, but from the 7 th Century, when the Slav tribes settled in Macedonia. It is a blatant misappropriation of the Bulgarian Medieval History. At first, the antiquity was not of great importance. Skopje s Historians adopted the viewpoint that the ancient Macedonians were not Greeks (except the ruling class, who had been hellenised), but finally they could not deny the Greek presence in Macedonia. In the last years, in view of the Greek-Skopje dispute over Macedonia, they attached more importance to the antiquity. According to them, when Slav tribes arrived in Macedonia, they mingled with the indigenous '' non Greek" Macedonians and so afterwards the name Macedonians was applicable to Slavs. It is an usurpation of the Greek historical heritage.

It is true that Skopje s histriography was and is still imbued by a historical myth, aiming at the consolidation of the new established identity, which was created under greenhouse conditions. This search of identity of the slav population in yugoslav Macedonia after the Second Word War incarnates the essence of the Macedonian Question after the Second Word War. Despite the means that had been used, the political results of the Macedonisation experiment are undeniable. Skopje s authorities managed through a forcible educational policy to create a new identity which does not want to be Bulgarian, Serbian or Greek. To what extent it is entitled to be called macedonian, is an other question that needs clarification. As long as Yugoslavia existed as a federal state, the macedonian issue did not plague the greek-yugoslav relations. The dispute about Macedonia was an academic one. Athens negociated with Belgrad about all the tasks concerning the bilateral relations. From time to time Belgrad was raising the question of putative "macedonian" minority in Greece, but only for internal consumption, to appease the Skopje s Government. As far as Greece concerns, it denied, as well as Bulgaria, the existence of a historical "macedonian" nation and "macedonian" minority, arguing that those who during the Second Word War and the Greek Civil War had identified themselves with either Bulgarian nationalism or Tito s Slawomacedonian movement left Greece. However, whenever the Greek Goverment was referring to Skopje in official diplomatic papers, it was using the term "Slawomacedonians" non seldom. The easy solution was to call all the inhabitants of Yugoslavia simply as Yugoslavs and by this means to skirt any difficulty regarding Skopje

After the collapse of Yugoslavia and the indenpence s proclamation of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia a new situation was created. Greece saw in the new state a threat both to its cultural heritage and territoraial integrity. All efforts made the by international factors ( Pineiros package deal, Vans-Owen plan, and the Greek -Skopje interim agreement ) aimed at forcing the Skopje s authorities to respect the inviolability of the borders, to renounce any territorial claims to Greece, not to conduct any hostile irredentist propaganda against Greece, to amend the Constitution, in order that no interference in the greek sovereign rights could be permissive and not to hoist the flag with the "Sun of Vergina". To a great extent these Greek demands have been satisfied. But the crucial and controversal question remains the name s issue. A great part of Greeks believe that the name Macedonia in any form ( derivatives, composite name) is a perpetual threat to Greece s territorial integrity and a lever of destabilization. The Greek-Skopje dispute was restricted to a tussle about the name Macedonia. On the other hand Greece considers that the Skopje state must survive at any rate. A rivival of the Great Buglarism and Great Serbianism or a division of this country between Albania and Bulgaria are undesirable things which will not only change the geopolitical balances, but also affect Greece itself. Skopje s authorities believe that they use the term Macedonia and Macedonians not because they are really descendants of the ancient Macedonians, but to differenciate themselves from the Bulgarians and the Serbs. They wonder how they could call themselves, if not Macedonians ? Bulgarians, Serbs, Dardanians etc.? Should they change their identity and become Bulgarians, Serbs or an amorphous mass, a flour with which one can bake every cake one wishes? What would be the consequences on the Balkan Peninsula, if the Skopje state collapses. An uncontrollbar situation, a rikindling of the old serbo-bulgarian antagonism with the active intervention of the albanian factor. Only under these circumstances will the so called "macedonian identity" cease to exist. Since the name Macedonians was used as a geographic term, its exclusive ethnological use by a slav group is a misappropriation and causes a confusion. A solution must be found to distinguish the Greeks from the Slavs. The most appropriate name could be the term Slavomacedonians. It was used in abundance by the same heralds of the notion of the "Macedonianism" as well as by the Greeks themselves.

Irrispective of the solution which will be found as far as the name s issue is concerned, FYROM must try to establish friedly relations with Greece. Only in Greece can FYROM discern a guarantee for its survival and economic prosperity, as the until now greek business activity in Skopje has already proved. The Skopje-Sofia relations are tense and will get worse. Both countries accuse each other of many questions relating to the boundary between slawomacedonianism and bulgarism. The Bulgarians will never get reconciled with the idea of a slawomacedonianism based on an antibulgarian basis. The Skopje-Belgrad relations are fairly good, but Skopje s authorities are not freed from the fear that Belgrad could exert pressure to FYROM to incorporate it into the Yugoslav Federation. The Skopje-Tirana relations are far from being those of good neigbourliness due to the albanian minority in Skopje which is trying to be recognized as a constitutional nation.

Now matter what the political settlement of the name s question will be, a Macedonian Problem will exist in the future, at least on the level of historiography. It will be difficult for Balkan historians to reach any sort of agreement about the historical aspects of the Macedonian Question. Chiefly, it will be the case between the Bulgarian historians and the Skopje s historians. The Greek Historians must open a direct dialog whith the Skopje s historians to clear up historical misunderstandings dating from the antiquity to twentieth century. Historical prejudices must be swept away from the school books. Studens from Skopje should visit Vergina and the archeological Museum of Thessaloniki. They have to become familiar with the Greek History. For Greek historians is easier to reach an understanding with the Skopje historians. In the last years there are many trends among the new generation of Skopje s Historians.

Will FYROM be a factor of destabilization by raising irredentist questions or inciting the minorities against the countries in which they live ? Who are these "macedonian" minorities? For seven years the Movement of Balkan Prosperity and the OMO-Ilinden have been trying to discover "macedonian"minorities in Greece and Bulgarian respectivly.And the results are negative. A potential factor of destabilization won t be Skopje, but Bulgaria and Albania. Bulgaria doesn t conceal its aspirations towards Skopje, but nowadays it is too weak to pursue a dynamic macedonian policy. The albanian question in Skopje and Kosovo will be the most controversal Balkan Question in the next century with unforseeable dimentions . Skopje s policy will be a defensive one. Greece must exploit all the advantages from its membership to NATO and the European Union to apply a constructive and fruitful Balkan-Policy. Why shall we believe that Skopje will threaten Greece and Why could not occur the contrary : Skopje s integration in the sphere of greek economic influence and the greek cultural circle. Is the Slawism stronger than the Hellenism?. I think, we are quite strong to face the new Balkan challenges.

The Interim Agreement, signed by Greece and FYROM in September 1995 under the auspices of the United Nations, opened up a new chapter in the relations between the two countries. Greece has already realised that the quintessence of the Macedonian Question is the international recognition of a new state, what claims to call itself "Republic of Macedonia," and not the change of identity of the slavic people living in FYROM in favour of a rebulgarisation, reserbianisation or in favour of the thesis that the Slavomacedonians are an "amorphous mass, a flour whith which one can bake every cake one wishes". Such a view could rekindle the old serbo-bulgarian antagonism over Macedonia also affecting Greece. If Skopje-State has to survive, which corresponds to greek interests, it should have an identity. After FYROM through the Interim Agreement had consented to respect the inviolability of the borders, to renounce any territorial claims to Greece , to refrain from any hostile propaganda against Greece, to interpret the article 49 of the Constitution in such a way that no interference in greek soverein rights could be permitted and to suspend the flag with the "Sun of Vergina", the Greek-Skopje dispute was restricted to a tussle about the name Macedonia. The Interim Agreement is an international act, binding for both countries, and bothe of them have to abide by it.

After the Greek-Skopje understanding FYROM ’ s foreign policy has had three basic keystones: a peaceful european integration, a renewal of the ties to America and a Balkan cooperation. National security and recovery of the ailing economy are two matters of great urgency. The political significance of the Interim Agreement for FYROM lies in the fact, that only after this rapprochment with Greece, a member of European Union and NATO, could FYROM begin to pursue a successful policy of european integration. Gligorov was now allowed to apply for an admission to european institutions. FYROM was admitted to the European Council and to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in the second half of 1995. Only after Greek Foreign Minister Pagalos had visited Skopje in March this year, could FYROM sign an agreement on cooperation with the European Union. This agreement, signed on the 29th April this year inLuxemburg, provides among other things that FYROM ’s farm products could be exported to the European market and that until the year 2000 the European Union must award a loan of 150.000.000 EKU to FYROM in order to improve its infrastructrure. Prior to FYROM , from the former yugoslav republics, only Slovenia had signed an agreement on association with the European Union.Similar agreements are not expected to be signed in the near future with Croatia and Rump Yugoslavia. It must be stressed that Skopje was admitted to european institutions under the name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It indicates that Europe takes into consideration the greek sensitivity over the name issue , which is still a subject of negociations. FYROM ’ s long term target is to become a member of the European Union. Skopje’ s authorities are conscious of the fact that FYROM ’ s way to Europe passes through Greece.

From the Central European countries it is mainly Germany which has been trying to boost political, economic and military relations with FYROM. Germany takes the first place in the sector of investments in FYROM and is an important trade partner. On the 9th April this year an agreement was signed in Skopje regarding the training of slavomacedonian high ranking officers and non commissioned officers in German Military Schools. Two days later Cervenkovski signed two agreements in Bonn. One agreement with Kinkel, relating to the construction of the railroad Skopje- Bulgaria, which will be financed by Germany with an amount of 30.000.000 DM . and an other one with Waigel which provided that Germany should deposit 170.000.000. DM in order that FYROM s’ foreign debt could be paid off. With its economic penetration into South Balkan Peninsula Germany strives to counteract american political leverage.

On the 17th June this year Gligorov paid an official visit to America with a view to arousing american interest in investments in his country (until now there are no noticeable american business activities in FYROM) and to securing the prolongation of american military presence. He asked President Clinton not to withdraw the 300 american soldiers, who are deployed in FYROM , and to replace them with others from Bosnia, should they pull out of FYROM. Clinton and Albright didn’t commit themselves to satisfy Gligorov s demands but confined to emphasize american interest in the stability of the area, as NATO military manouvres (Partnership for Peace) on the soil of FYROM in Krivolak in May this year had already proved. UNO General Secretary Kofi Anan has already suggested a reduction of the UNO troops , stationed in FYROM, arguing that there were no external factors which threatened FYROM s integrity, but only internal ethnic tensions. A final decision will be made inNovember. In order to anticipate FYROM’ s apprehensions, NATO high commandant in Europe General Vesli Clark paid an official visit to Skopje at the end of August and offered an future military cooperation between FYROM and America as a counterbalance for the withdrawal of UNO troops.

The Greek-Skopje interim agreement brought about a promotion of interbalkan cooperation. Greek economic presence in FYROM has made great strides in many sectors and Greece takes the fourth place in investments. Cultural exchanges, development of tourism, mutual visits of politicians to both countries are the first signs for a new era in the bilateral relations. Gligorov has often praised Greece s constructive policy in the Balkan Peninsula having forgotten the past years of animosity. Greek-Skopje relations are not yet normal in the diplomatic sense, but the current developments are irreversible and must result in a climat of good neighbourliness.

On the 8 th April last year The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and FYROM signed an agreement on the regulations of relations and the promotion of cooperation between the two countries, which in fact meant a mutual recognition. Both countries established full diplomatic relations at the level of Ambassadors. Although Belgrad was initially reluctant to recognise Skopje under the name "Republic of Macedonia, finally it backed out and did it. Many politicians speculated that through this political motion Belgrad was aiming at blackmailing a favourable settlement of the question of the serbian free trade zone in the harbour of Salonica from Greece. But in fact Belgrad acted under the pressure of the international factor to recognise the former yugoslav republics immediately after the Dayton Agreement. Since Skopje didn’t want to be recognised under a name other than Republic of Macedonia and accepted the State continuity and international legal personality of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which implied that Rump Yugoslavia was recognised by FYROM as the successor of previous federal Yugoslavia, Belgrad gave in. The terms "Republic of Macedonia and Macedonians" don t cause difficulties to many serbian politicians(especially to the Socialists) as far as these terms have an antibulgarian connotation. Athens was not amazed at this yugoslav diplomatic proceeding. But there are in Serbia also factors ( some politicians, historians, the serbian orthodox church) who claim that Macedonia is South Serbia and that the "macedonian nation" is artificially contrived by the Communist International.

Early in September last year yugoslav Prime Minister Kontic visited Skopje and signed a lot of agreements on economic cooperation and trade which resulted in a Customs Union between Belgrad and Skopje. Early in July this year Cervenkovski visited Belgrad and signed other agreements on the abolition of visa, the opening of new consulates, cultural and sport exchanges and the setting up of a mixed commission to examine and correct the school books. Bussinesmen of two countries met at the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce in Belgrad and discussed among other things the possibility of assuming by jugoslav companies the reconstruction of the power suply network in FYROM, the construction of railway networks and even an oil pipeline from Thessaloniki to Yugoslavia via FYROM. Since May 1997 a mixed diplomatic -expert Commission has been working on the demarcation of the borders. But no agreement has been signed until now. Belgrad lays claims to some strips which, however, are of strategic importance for Skopje. As far as the future of the bilateral relations is concerned, it could be said that Belgrad will exert a strong influence on FYROM . Milosevic has been trying to talk Gligorov into incorporating FYROM into the Federal Yugoslavia, threatening that in a contrary case the serbian army would not come to help FYROM , should an albanian uprising of great dimensions break out in Tetovo. Gligorov refuses to discuss such an option.

Skopje’ s relations to Sofia are characterised by stagnation. Both countries are on bad terms and squabble over the boundary between bulgarism and slawomacedonianism. The Bulgarians will never get reconciled with the idea of a slawomacedonianism based on an antibulgarian basis. President Stojanov said in Strasburg some months ago that the macedonian history was the most romantic part of the bulgarian history to demonstrate that the so called Macedonians had a bulgarian national awareness and only after 1944 they differenciated themselves from the Bulgarians. Nowadays Sofia claims that about 30.000 Bulgarians were killed by yugoslav secret police between 1944-1950 as opponents to the forcible antibulgarian macedonisation policy. About 20 draft agreements could not be signed because of the language barrier. It is not accidental that Bulgaria refuses to sign the agreemens in english to skirt any difficulty about the language, as Greece did. Bulgaria doesn’t conceal its aspirations towards Skopje, but nowadays it is to weak to pursue a dynamic macedonian policy. The greek-serbian penetration into FYROM is undesirable for Sofia. Only few days after the Greek-Skopje interim agreement and immediately after Gligorov’ s visit to Belgrad an assassination attempt was made on the life of the latter, propably by agents of the probulgarian organization MPO. It is a bad omen.

If the bulgarian factor is a potential factor of destabilization, the albanian factor is a real one.The albanian question in FYROM has a long history dating back from the Second World War, when the western parts of FYROM with Kossovo were integral parts of the Great Albania and the vast majority of the Albanians joined rather albanian nationalist organizations than the jugoslav resistance movement. In the Federal Socialist Republic of Macedonia the Albanians were officialy recognised as a minority and were granted cultural and educational rights, without, however, being organically integrated. The disturbances in Kosovo in October 1968 and April 1981 had an immediate impact on the Albanians in yugoslav Macedonia, who, like the Kosovars, were seeking to establish an Albanian Federal Republic. Illegal Albanian organisations were active in the territory of yugoslav Macedonia, urging secession from Yugoslavia. After the collapse of Yugoslavia Albanians in FYROM (over 500.000) have been trying to be recognised as an equal constituent nation, but their long term target is the secession. The better FYROM seems to consolidate its international positions, the deeper gets the gap between Slawomacedonians and Albanians who are striving for the creation of a shadow state in the western parts. For the time being they claim the equality of albanian language as a second official state language, the legalization of the albanian University in Tetovo and the right to hoist the albanian flag. Early in February 1995, when the Albanians sought to open their own University in Tetovo, FYROM’ s police intervened to avert it and cracked down on demonstrators. One ethnic Albanian died, several were arrested and sentenced to prison including the Rector of the University Fadil Sylejmani. Due to the ethnic tensions political balances are very flimsy. When in January this year the moderate albanian party PDP (Party for Democratic Prosperity) threatened to relinquinsh the Coalition Government, the Parliement passed a bill which provided that albanian students in the Pedagogic Faculty could be tought in albanian language . But all albanian parties, represented in Parliement, did not vote for the bill, as it was a minimal concession to the Albanians in their assessment. Slavomacedonian students reacted strongly to this Governments’ concession, they demonstrated in the streets of Skopje against the govermental decision, using a very abusive language for the Albanians, and went on hunger strike. Political atmosphere in FYROM was further burdened by the election of the albanian Alajdin Demiri as mayor in Tetovo in February this year. Although the two important albanian parties, the moderatePDP and the radical PDPA had nominated different candidates, at the last moment, in order to prevent the election of the slawomacedonian candidate, agreed on a common candidature. After his election Demiri tried to establish a close cooperation with Rufi Osmani, the albanian mayor in Gostivar, regarding the hoisting of the albanian flag on the building of the municipalities, in which Albanians are the mayors. Indeed, for some weeks the albanian and the turkish flag had flown on the municipalities of Tetovo and Gostivar. Rufi Osmani did not comply neither with the Constitutional Court’ s decision to low the albanian and the turkish flag nor with the new law on national minorities which provided that their flag could be hoisted only during national celebrations. When on the 9th July police forces forcibely took down the albanian and the turkish flag from the Municipality in Gostivar, the crisis escalated. In a scuffle with the police 2 Albanians died, 15 were injured and over 300 arrested.Rufi Osmani was detained in custody and he will be on trial for disseminating ethnic hatred. Fears were expressed that the disturbances in Gostivar could spill over into Tetovo and Debar. All albanian parties, in FYROM and in Albania as well, condemned the police action.Demonstrators in Tirana burnt FYROM’ s flag in front of the Embassy. The leader of PDPA, Arben Dzaferi, went to Tirana to give interviews about the situation. On the one hand he accused Gligorov of having acted in compliance with instructions given by Milosevic, but on the other hand he revealed that after the collapse of Yugoslavia all albanian parties in Kosovo and FYROM agreed on a common policy aiming at independence for Kosovo and autonomy for the western parts of FYROM. Gligorov, who during the crisis was in Madrid to attend a NATO summit conference and so could decline any responsibility for the police intervention, has corroborated Dzaferi’ s statements in a recent interview in the Belgrad "Ekonomska Politika"

The ethnic tensions in FYROM coincided with the crisis in Albania itself. For the first time FYROM’s army was on the alert and in military preparedness. Soldiers are still patrolling the borders to prevent an influx of refugees from Albania, but also drug and arms smuggling. Severe frontier incidents proved unavoidable. Rumors are going about that Berisha’ s followers will try to overthrow the new socialist albanian government by stirring up troubles in FYROM and Kosovo and calling on Fatos Nano to take a clear position towards the unredeemed Albanians. A large nunmber of Albanians in FYROM possess weapons and guns. On the 7th July the two albanian parties, the PDPA and the Popular Democratic Party, were merged in one party. Its name ''Democratic Party" clearly shows a spirit of solidarity with Berisha’ s party. The albanian factor in FYROM is its Achelles’ s heel and the developments must be folllowed. It is true that today America is against the creation of an albanian shadow state in FYROM and Kossovo’s independence .However, the internal dynamic of events and evolutions might be the most decisive factor , since policy is a continous readjustment to changing conditions. In June 1991 America was against Yugoslavia’s dissolution and adopted the greek view point. But it shifted its attitude swiftly.

Keeping all these parametres in mind, it is a simplification to say that the Macedonian Question will be definitely settled, if Skopje and Athens come to a compromise solution about the name of the new state in the international fora. Sooner or later such a compromise solution will be imposed by the Security Council. FYROM must also accept the term Slawomacedonians, as it has no pejorative connotation and was used in abundance by the same heralds of the notion of macedonianism (Krst Misirkov, Dimitri Cupovski and others). But a Macedonian Question will exist further . Political circles in Skopje will not give up raising the question of putative macedonian minorities in Greece, Bulgaria and Albania, now matter to what extent it is due to internal consumption. The Skopje-Sofia relations will get worse, the albanian factor might cause uncontrollable situations and Yugoslavia will try to exert more and more political influence. Apart from the political dimensions, it will be difficult for the historians of the Balkan countries to come to an understanding regarding the historical aspects of the Macedonian Question. Chiefly, it will be the case between bulgarian and slawomacedonian historians.

In the new conditions FYROM must try to establish friendly relations with Greece. Only in Greece should FYROM discern a guarantee for its survival and economic prosperity. Greece is taking advantage of its membership in NATO and the European Union to pursue a constructive and deterrant Balkan policy , but Gligorov s intransigence in the name issue is an inhibitory factor for the full normalisation of the bilateral relations. The dispute about Macedonia must be tranferred from the politicians to the historians. Greek historians must open a direct dialog with the Skopje s historians to clear up historical misunderstandings. Historical prejudices and stereotyps should be swept away from the school books. The slawomacedonian nation was created in a communist society under green house conditions. Nowadays there are various trends among the new generation of Skopje s historians who are reapraising their own history. We must contact them. The slawomacedonian identity is still an identity in evolution. This identity will cease to exist, if the Skopje-State collapses. Greece is against this option. Skopje s authorities must understand it and draw the relevant conclusions