BACKLASH AGAINST DALIT WOMEN CREATING FOOD SECURITY IN RURAL INDIA:
MYOPIA OR ANOTHER CHAPTER OF CASTE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION?
Dr. V. Rukmini Rao,
Deccan Development Society,
A#6, Meera Apartments, Basheerbagh, Hyderabad, A.P., 500029, India.
Email: Rukmini Rao
Background: Over the past two decades, the Deccan Development Society (DDS), a rural non-government
organization, has established strong ties with dalit women (1) in more than 80 villages of the semi-arid Medak
District, 100 kilometers west of Hyderabad in the state of Andhra Pradesh. In 1995, the DDS invested the hopes
of these traditionally poverty-stricken women and their communities in the government funded experiment which
is referred to as the Alternative Public Distribution System programme (APDS). A unique means of building
community-based management of the local production, storage and distribution of coarse grains, sponsored and
entirely funded by the Ministry of Rural Areas and Employment, the APDS promised dalit farmers (women) a
decentralized food security which was viewed by the DDS, and indeed by the entire Indian NGO movement, as a
turning point in the struggle of these economically destitute communities for food and social self-reliance. The
APDS in the Medak District: Following the identification of fallow lands which met with the regulations
governing the project, Committees of farmers, with each woman taking care of around 20 acres, were elected to
collect the Ministry of Rural Areas and Employment's finance from DDS, and distribute it amongst the
participating villages for the coordinated ploughing, organic fertilizing, sowing and weeding of unproductive
(fallow) land. TheMinistry's investment of Rs.2,600 per acre over three years was to be repaid by farmers with
deposits of pre-fixed quantities of grain at pre-fixed prices over the next three years. The committees collected
grain for both the loan payments, and for sale to poor households (2) on a quota basis (3) and were also
responsible for depositing the sale proceeds into the Community Grain Fund which had been established in each
village to ensure long term sustainability.
In 1995, the first year of the programme, 1000 hectares of cultivable fallows and extremely marginal lands came
under the plough in 32 villages across the Medak District. As a result over 7,00,000 kgs of extra Sorghum was
grown. The additional fodder produced supported 5,500 cattle and created an extra 8000 wages and provided
Sorghum to 2,600 families at the rate of Rs.2/- per kilo. Accordingly, the success of APDS programme in the
Medak District waswidely hailed in a number of national and international agricultural journals, including
Pesticide News, SEEDLING, AILEA News, Forests, Trees and People (4), and the Newsletter of the FAO. , a
video documentary, "Community Grain Fund", graphically illustrated the positive impact of the APDS project on
the lives of the women of Zaheerabad (5). Ultimately, the project
drew praise at the highest level, when experts gathered in Rome for the 1996 World Food Summit focused on the
project's dual importance; first for empowering local communities, especially women, to acquire and manage
their own Food Security, and equally, as a solution to the inadequate and/or unsustainable food security which
plagues so many regions of today's developing world. This experiment demonstrated an alternative pathway to
sustainable food to that imposed by multinational companies in their thrust to monopolize world agriculture and
food trade (6).
Dalit farmers and the APDS: While the success of the APDS is acclaimed, the contributions of dalit farmers have
largely passed unrecognised. From the beginning these women drew on their past experience with Government
assigned land to confront the true significance of fallows for poverty-striken communities. In the main, these
lands are barren, requiring considerable investment for their transformation into productive acreage. In the face
of economic hardship, a common tactic is to work only the proportion of the land which is most amenable to the
plough. The remaining is left idle, but rather than declaring a proportion fallow, the entire area is claimed to be
under cultivation. The alternative to expose the extent of the fallow, risks both land grabbing by unscrupulous
village elite, and the land's reclaim by Government for redistribution toother landless farmers.
The "hidden" fallows of poor farmers are not the only source of error in official figures of unproductive acres;
lands which produce as little as 10-20 kilograms of grain per acre are also scored in the official count of holdings
under the plough. Like "hidden" fallows, land producing meager yields are no less fallow than land which has
remained unploughed for a decade or more, and were justifiably included by dalit farmers in their reckoning of
land which qualified for tillage within the APDS project. In effect, the policy adopted by dalit farmers
transcended the official definition of fallows. Rather, their approach came to terms with "real" fallows as distinct
from the rhetoric of "legal" fallows. Government officials have often acknowledged that there are no reliable
estimates of fallows and that land records need to be streamlined. Equally, with a wisdom belying their level of
formal education, the dalit farmers prudently argued that APDS farming of unproductive properties, which are not
part of the official estimate of fallows, might be a way to halt the rapid desertification of barren land.
Prior to commencing APDS farming, DDS sanghams surveyed fallows in their villages, and were able to identify
2675 acres of land in the 32 villages which complied with Ministry provisos that APDS farming took place both
on fallow land, and for the
benefit of the poor (7). A minimum limit of 70 acres of available fallow land was set to qualify a village's entry in
the APDS project, but an upper limit was also imposed to prevent any one village from acquiring an excessive
share, for example by farming 200 acres, of the APDS budget. In this way, the minimum acreage guaranteed
each village a harvest of some 100 quintals of jowar.
In addition to their efficient and just management skills the dalit women exhibited remarkable fortitude when
natural disasters beset the region in the first two years of the APDS program. On the first occasion, when the
1995 cyclone destroyed more than half of their crop, the dalit farmers were left with only 1685 of the 4012
quintals of grain needed as grain deposit for repayment of the project loan from the Ministry of Rural Areas and
Employment. The women paid cash to overcome the shortage. They bought grain in neighbouring markets and
made it available to other poor. But, more than avoiding indebtedness to the Ministry of Rural Areas and
Employment, flexibility and community spirit of the dalit farmers had overcome the hunger crisis in their villages.
A year later in 1996, after their crops had been entirely deciminated by the extreme drought conditions, the dalit
farmers came up with a remarkably innovative strategy to meet the drought-related threats of starvation. Invested
with the approval of every
stake-holder in the APDS project to withdraw cash from the Community Grain accounts the village Committees
journeyed outside of the drought-stricken region to the markets of Sholapurand Latur, where they purchased
jowar at a net price, inclusive of transport expenses Rs.4.50 per kg. On return, the women kept within the one
rupee per kilo subsidy agreement by setting the price of the acquired jowar at one rupee per kilo less than its
actual market cost, Rs.3.50 per kg. In more ways than enough, the dalit farmers from the Medak District
repeatedly showed their community-based generosity. Born into poverty, and caste and gender discrimination
(8), the APDS scheme had given them a chance to create and manage their own food security. Seizing this
opportunity, they redefined agricultural terms which are hollow in the context of life for
the poor. From their humble beginnings (9), they rose to display an indomitable spirit, creative leadership, and
an extraordinary community-based generosity to share the benefits of the APDS with equity the villages in their
district. In a similar vein, their courage, conviction and good will enabled them to overcome the obvious burdens
of two major climatic tragedies (10). Yet, as the of 1997 and 1998 unfolded their invincible vitality may have
aggravated their unforeseen wth local political elites and bureaucrats.
Bureaucracy at work: Starting with approximately 60 per cent of the total finance approved bythe Ministry of
Rural Areas and Employment, the APDS project was introduced to the Medak District in the pre monsoon period
of 1995, and finished its first year cycle of January-Februray 1996. In April 1996, following a DDS application
to the Ministry of Rural Areas and Employment for the release of the second yearâs funding a team from the Zilla
Parishad administration intervened to inspect the project before forwarding the DDS applicaton onto the
Ministry. After yet a further considerable delay, the Ministry of Rural Areas and Employment also sent a team of
social scientists, economists, sustainable agriculture experts, and statisticians from the National Institute of Rural
Development to evaluate the project. The evaluation, performed with academic rigor over a period of one month,
was extremely positive, and the second year's grant was released by the Ministry, one year behind schedule, on
April 7, 1997. By mistake, the funding was sent to the Medak District DRDA, where for 15 weeks it was unable
to be traced. After much confusion and anxiety, the cheque was 'discovered' and on July 21, 1997, transferred
as intended by the Ministry for disbursement by the Zilla Parishad of the Medak District.
Despite numerous conversations between DDS and district officials in the Medak District, and additional
inspections which appeared to satisfy officials ofthe Zilla Parishad, the finances were not released. During this
waiting period , the senior official of the Zilla Parishad, Joint Collector, expressed his desire to personally review
the project. Several weeks later after repeated reminders from DDS that delays were sabotaging the operations of
both DDS itself, and the dalit farmers, the Joint Collector arrived for his investigation, visiting just three of the 32
APDS villages. Uncertain of the reasons for his inspection, DDS and the dalit farmers waited anxiously, but in
vain, to learn of his findings. Finally, driven to visit the Joint Collector at his office, DDS learned that he was
dissatisfied with APDS farming on land which was officially registered as fertile. At considerable length, DDS
explained the true nature of fallows in the region, and, were in the process of setting up a conference to further
clarify this point for him, when yet another team of Zilla Parishad officials and political leaders made an
impromptu tour of the dalit womenâs holdings in three villages. Aboard a convoy of eleven jeeps, pre-armed
with media journalists, the cursory inspection was completed in just two hours, after which a press conference
was convened to condemn the project. In contrast to the delays of the previous 12 months, a second press
conference was instantly convened back in Hyderabad where the Honourable Rajya Sabha member Mr. S.
Ramachandra Reddy set forth with allegations of dalit women's corruption, and a call to blacklist the DDS (11).
This, inspite of the evaluation carried out by the premier National Institute of Rural Development and its
recommendations to release the funds.
No matter what lies behind the funding debacle, its repercussons are tragic. At all levels, the APDS project in the
Medak District was a resounding success. Within a brief period, 1720 marginal and small farmers transformed
2675 acres of barren land in 32 villages into productive property, 4598 families became coarse grain-based APDS
cardholders, production levels increased by more than half a million kilograms, to 687500 kg, in the 32 villages,
and 5500 cattle were fed with the fodder resulting from the project's crops.
There is a clear alliance between political and bureaucratic elites in the district. Hypothesizing from past
experiences in the region, any or all of the following may account for the undermining of the APDS programme
while in the midst of promoting
self-sufficiency amongst dalit farmers:
1) The DDS was steadfast in its refusal to offer bribes to either bureaucrats or politicians in order to extract the
flow of project funds.
2) The DDS serves only the poor, and is without allegiance to any political party.
3) The dalit womenâs struggle in the area for increased wages and reduced
dependancy on local landlords has aggravated the wealthy. At the same time, dalit women and their children
have fought to escape the corrupt labour relations of bondage, thereby denying the local elites cheap child labour.
4) While some senior officials are sympathetic to the cause of the women, their paralysis and reluctance to risk
censure from political leaders means that the dalits remain politically voiceless. On this background it is difficult
to avoid the conclusion that this conflict is about power, control and superiority. In a sense, the bureaucratic
blindspot is a political mechanism which preseves the status quo , dalit communities are born into poverty, and
social discrimination , and for elites whose personal security stems from subordinating those whom they govern,
the APDS-generated self-reliance in dalit communities may have been an uprising which caste-conscious elites
were determined to stamp out (12). Social bigotry would explain the insensitivity of politicians and bureaucrats
to the poorest of the rural women having, for the first time in their lives, control over their own food security.
But at the end of the day, while the dalit farmers may have flouted the official norms, it is blatantly obvious that
had they stuck rigidly to the rules, the APDS project would almost certainly have died. Perhaps too,had the dalit
women been inflexible, they and their starving families may have passed away with the project.
Indisputably, the scheme has extraordinary potential for India's semi-arid regions using rainfed farming systems,
just as it has wide-reaching implications for low-income groups in the rural areas of most, if not all Third World
countries. Rather, the whole sorry episode raises grave concerns for the future of food security. One thing is
certain, should the process of globalization (13, 14), and accompanying pressures from the World Bank and
International Monitory Fund, lead India to abandon such projects, the poverty of today will pale to insignificance
compared with that of tomorrow , it is extremely doubtful whether marginalized communities, particularly
women, can survive if the food shortages and price rises of today's India continue to escalate.
REFERENCES AND NOTES:
1. The category of Scheduled Caste is defined in the Indian Constitution and refers to communities who were
treated as "untouchable". More recently, though the adjective untouchable has been replaced by the self
proclaimed adjective 'dalit', the social discrimination against Scheduled Caste communities persists.
2. Households eligible for support from the Community Grain Bank were identified by open, participatory
Wealth Ranking exercises, and allotted colored Jowar Cards as per their poverty level.
3. Jowar deposited to repay the funding of the APDS project by the Ministry of Rural Areas and Employment
was valued at Rs.3.00 per kilogram. Sold to poor households at Rs.2.00 per kilogram, this meant that APDS
grain was subsidised at a rate of one rupee per kilogram. The subsidy of Rs.1.00 per kilogram was also
maintained in periods when grain prices exceeded Rs.3.00 per kilogram.
4. Satheesh, P.V. History in the making: Women design and manage an Alternative Public Distribution System.
Forests, Trees and People, 1997, Newsletter 34, pages 1-4.
5. Satheesh, P.V. Producer of Film Documentary, ãCommunity Grain Fund, 1997.
6.. Shiva, Vandana. Biopiracy The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge. Boston, Massachusetts: South End Press,
1997, pages 1-148.
7. DDS duly informed the Ministry of Rural Areas and Employment in New Delhi, together with the Zilla
Parishad [the Elected Body] and in the Medak district that the survey had identified only 2675 fallow acres which
qualified for APDS farming in the participating villages, accordingly the budget was downscaled.
8. Rao, Rukmini. Bonded by caste and gender: The feminization of poverty in rural India. Political Environments
1997; Fall (Issue No. 5): 1-7.
9. Janaki Nair. The Dalit Movement. The Hindu, May 7, 1995.
10. Bouma, M.J., Kovats, R.S., Goulbet, S.A., Cox, J. St. H. and Haines, A. Global assessment of El Nio's
disaster burden. The Lancet 1997; 350: 1435-1438.
11. The Rs. 2.6 M sanctioned by the Central Government of India for the APDS project was delayed and
withheld by District Officials and vested elite interests in the Medak District. While the finance issued by the
Ministry of Rural Areas and Employment continues to be withheld by the local Zilla Parishad, DDS has
jeopardized many of its other projects to provide the dalit farmers with Rs. 2.1 M to continue their farming.
12. Iyer, Lalita. Shallow minds - Andhra Pradesh: A project to make Dalit women self-sufficient runs into
trouble. The Week Magazine, December 14, 1997.
13. Shiva, Vandana, Jafri, Afsar H. and Bedi, Gitanjati. The ecological cost of economic globalization. New
Delhi - Research Foundation for Science, Technology, and Ecology, 1997.
14. Salleh, Ariel. Ecofeminism as Politics: Nature, Marx and the postmodern. London New York: Zed Books
Limited, 1997.
