FOR AND AGAINST: Different Views
Document 4

Democracy of Political structures
This document warns that the Draft Bill formed by the Federal Convention will not deliver a sufficiently democratic Constitution for Australia.

Focus questions
FeQ7 In general, what is the writers' opinion regarding Australian Federation?
FeQ8 What are the objections to the proposed House of Representatives?
FeQ9 What are the objections to the proposed Senate?

ANTI-CONVENTION BILL MANIFESTO

– To the Electors of New South Wales. – In the course of the next few weeks you will be called upon to say "Yes" or "No" to the question whether you approve of the terms upon which it is proposed Australia shall federate. The occasion marks a grave crisis in the affairs, not only of the people of New South Wales, but of all Australia. Great care and deep consideration should, therefore, precede the vote of every man. Being in favor of the union of the Australian colonies is not in itself sufficient to justify a vote in favor of the present bill. One may be earnestly in favor of the federation of Australia and still be emphatically opposed to the conditions prescribed by the Convention Bill. That, indeed, is the position of those who here take the liberty of addressing you.

THE UNION DESIRED.
That there is in New South Wales a widespread desire for the union of the Australian colonies is outside the region of doubt. The form of union desired we believe to be one which, while leaving the States in a position of perfect independence in regard to many questions of local concern, would permit matters of common interest to all Australians – i.e., the affairs of the nation at large – to be dealt with according to the will of the majority of Australian people.

THE DEATH-KNELL OF MAJORITY RULE.
The fatal and unchangeable defect of the Convention Bill is that it does not provide for this. It proposes that the Federal Legislature shall consist of two Houses – the House of Representatives in which the people of the various States are represented according to their numbers (except that Tasmania and West Australia are to have five instead of their due number, three), and the Senate – or States House – in which each State, large or small, is represented by six (6) Senators. That is to say, New South Wales with 1,323,000, Victoria with 1,176,000, South Australia with 363,000, Tasmania with 171,000, and West Australia with 161,000 persons are all placed upon a precisely equal footing. The effect of constituting the Senate in this way is to impose an insuperable obstacle in the way of majority rule, and to implant in the Constitution the seeds of inevitable discord. Seven hundred thousand (700,000) people in the three smaller States will possess between them 18 Senators, whilst two millions and a half (2,500,000) in the two larger States will be represented by only 12 Senators. This would give a minority of people 50 per cent. more power in the Senate than was possessed by 3 ½ times their number; and as in every essential regard the Senate would wield powers co-equal with those possessed by the House of Representatives, it is plain that the representatives of about one-fourth of the total population could keep the rest of the nation at bay until it agreed to the terms which the minority were pleased to dictate.

THE BIRTH OF MINORITY RULE IN AUSTRALIA.
The meaning and effects of this are obvious. If two and a half millions of people desire a policy of protection, they cannot have it unless a mere fraction of the population agree to give it to them. If an overwhelming majority of the nation demand direct taxation they must wait the minority's pleasure before they can have it. Should the preference of the nation, speaking with majority voice, be for a "freetrade tariff," this cannot be secured without the assent of the same small, but all-powerful, minority. To a handful of people is given the power to mould the franchise of Federated Australia. In the same quarter is vested the power of determining what measure of restriction shall be adopted towards alien races and undesirable immigrants. It is for the minority, too, to say what shall be the scope and character of the laws establishing uniformity of procedure in regard to marriage and divorce over all Australia. It must be borne in mind that whatever constitution may be adopted, it is not for a day, or for a year, but for all time. The day may come when Federated Australia will have the right (by England's invitation) to support or discountenance treaties with other nations. The answer to such questions must be decided upon in accordance with the will of the securely-entrenched minority, so that even in questions involving peace or war, the power of arbitrament would rest with them …

… as the Senate is clothed with full power to reject all measures, including tariff laws and supply bills, it could, by opposing the former, derange business almost to the point of paralysis, and, by opposing the latter, render the Government incapable of paying the civil service, while in either case a state of chaos would exist which could only end in the voluntary submission of the minority, or the enforced submission of the majority of the people. How is it possible that Australians can ever become one if, after they have come together in name, they are thus kept apart in fact?

Excerpt from Manifesto of the Anti-Convention Bill League, Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 25 April 1898, cited in Scott Bennett (ed.), Federation, Cassell Australia, North Melbourne, 1975, pp. 37-8.