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The military tactician will agree wholeheartedly with the maxim that 'time spent in reconnaissance is never wasted'. Often the 4th Anti Tank Regiment's officers attempted to undertake the necessary reconnaissances with varying degrees of success. The next incident in the rising crescendo of  disaster visited upon the Regiment was a reconnaissance undertaken by unit officers of the 'Singapore Island Fortress'; a reconnaissance which should have been ordered by superior headquarters months previously as part of a determined and cohesive defence plan.
On the 28th January 1942 Majors Fleming and Quick conducted a reconnaissance of the Australian sector of Singapore Island where it was now obvious that any final stand would be undertaken. The two officers found to their dismay that an effective anti tank defensive plan for the Australian sector would be impossible. This conclusion was based on several factors. Firstly there was insufficient time. Two days had been allotted to implement a plan, in fact there was really only one day available as 22nd Brigade had not conformed fully with the rest of the Division in the withdrawal. Further, more time was required to reconnoitre the beaches and site gun positions. The final straw was that valuable time was lost because representatives from superior headquarters failed to keep appointments with the two anti tank officers.
Fleming and Quick were staggered to find that there had been no attempt by superior headquarters to develop a co-ordinated anti tank defence plan for Singapore Island. In the event this was later done by individual Divisional anti tank commanders. Despite their best efforts Fleming and Quick could not find any evidence of a general military appreciation of the tactical situation. For instance there was no guidance on which parts of the Australian area were considered to be more important or whether any particular area was deemed to be especially vulnerable. The siting of beach guns therefore was virtually impossible without some indication of the relative importance attached by higher authority to the probable enemy landing places.
In view of the large area to be covered and the short amount of time available Major F leming asked for access to any existing plans for anti tank defence of the western part of the island, also for proposed anti tank works and detail of channel depths and beaches. With one exception, that two anti tank ditches were being dug, no other information was forthcoming; it was later found that even this information was wrong and that only one ditch was being prepared. The next day a Royal Australian Artillery conference was convened. In essence the direction arising from this meeting was that there would be no direction! Rather it was decided, in view of the general indecision and confusion that each regiment would draw up its own plan.
While the two unit majors were battling with the corridors of power the 13th and 15th Batteries were pulled back further with the infantry. By this time the roads and tracks leading towards Singapore Island were a quagmire having had so much traffic chum up the area over the past few weeks. As a result the exhausted anti tankers spent hour after hour extricating their vehicles and guns, only to have them bogged again fifty yards further down the track. To add to the dilemma, Japanese aerial attacks continued relentlessly. At midday on the 29th the 13th Battery was near the 25 mile post with the 2/30th Battalion. The 2/26th was a further four miles to the rear and the 2nd Cordon Battalion had been trucked back to Singapore Island. Regimental Headquarters by this time had been located at Johore Bahru. The same evening 15th Battery less a section from H Troop withdrew, joined a convoy and moved to Singapore Island.
On the morning of the 30th the 13th Battery under Lieutenant Watson started to move across the Causeway to positions on Singapore Island. Better late than never, the 15th Battery exchanged its 75 millimetre guns for 2 pounders and consolidated at the 13 mile post on Choa Chu Kang Road on the far western side of the Island. Two of the old guns were sited in a beach defence role and the remaining men and guns covering the withdrawal on the mainland joined Battery Headquarters.
In the evening the remnants of 16th Battery also moved across the Causeway to harbour on the Choa Chu Kang Road, then to positions around Jurong Village south of 15th Battery. One troop remained to cover the withdrawal of the rear guard force across the Causeway. At this stage the Advanced or Tactical Headquarters of the Regiment was established on the Jurong road.
By early on the morning of the 31st January all those allied soldiers able to do so, had crossed the Causeway to Singapore and the Japanese had occupied Johore Bahru. At 1.30am the last elements of the Regiment on the mainland, consisting of the 13th Battery Headquarters and B Troop returned across the Causeway with the 2/30th Battalion. At 8.15am the Causeway was blown somewhat ineffectually by demolition charges. Just over a week later the Japanese would land on the north western sector of Singapore Island and on 9th February the Causeway area itself would be retaken by the enemy. But the anti tankers had much to do before these events were to take place.
At this stage all elements of the 4th Anti Tank Regiment although still dispersed, were closer together than they had been for several weeks. The 13th, 15th and 16th Batteries were disposed in the Causeway, North West and South West sectors respectively. Battery Headquarters was established with Headquarters 27th Brigade near Yew Tee Village. A Troop remained in harbour on the Jurong Road in reserve while C Troop was reorganised and equipped with Breda guns and reinforced by B Echelon personnel. For a change 15th Battery was not moved during the day but 16th Battery was placed in support of the 44th Indian Brigade in the south west. Captain McBain was allocated the dubious title of Officer Commanding Beach Guns.
For the next few days the Regiment was busy digging and preparing defences as the Japanese started bombarding Singapore in earnest. Two 75 millimetre guns from the 15th Battery were sited on the beach and Colonel McEachern was appointed acting Commander Royal Artillery. 13th Battery Headquarters moved with the 27th Brigade Headquarters to Singapore's Dairy Farm Road and there were several officer appointment changes. Lieutenant Ross took command of the 13th Battery C Troop armed with Breda guns while Major Schneider took over command of the battery allowing Captain Stabb to return to his former position of adjutant. Lieutenant Smith was posted across to 15th Battery as a Troop Commander.
A further adjustment saw 13th Battery rearranged as a four rather than three troop establishment with two troops of 2 pounders, one troop with Bredas and a troop with 75 millimetre guns. The anti tankers were heartened to find a flight of Hurricane fighters on Singapore Island and made to welcome the New Zealand pilot of one aircraft. The New Zealander Sergeant in acknowledging the excited remarks of the Australians grimly responded that they had best take a good quick look at the Hurricanes, as the aircraft were about to be flown back to Sumatra; and so they were.
On the 6th February, 13th Battery's fourth or X Troop as it was called, with its four 75 millimetre guns was placed under command of 15th Battery in the 22nd Brigade area. Unfortunately Lieutenant Ross was injured in a motorcycle accident, broke his leg and was evacuated to the Casualty Clearing Station. Bombardier Grant received a meteoric rise as a result and was placed in command of C Troop. So it was that men of the 13th Battery were separated by Johore Strait and a few hundred yards of waterway from the Japanese Army as it coiled itself up on the mainland, ready to spring onto the defenders of Singapore. It was soon realised that the 75 millimetre Breda guns were unfamiliar to many of the anti tankers. As a result, hasty instruction was given, literally under the noses of the enemy.
During the first days of February massive evacuations of civilians from Singapore took place. At last it was generally accepted that 'The Singapore Fortress' was in peril. As a consequence the tendency to scoff at or ignore the warnings was replaced by widespread terror and an overwhelming desire to get away from the Island as soon as possible. Almost anything was pressed into service to move people out of the besieged city. Larger ships made for Batavia, smaller craft crossed the Straits of Malacca to Sumatra. Some seriously ill or wounded soldiers like anti tanker Ted Warren were able to be placed on hospital ships such as the Indian vessel 'Talamba' and evacuated. The destination varied but was commonly Sumatra or Colombo. These evacuations continued up to the last few days before capitulation, but most sick and wounded had to remain in Singapore.
The Japanese on the mainland then began to employ an observation balloon with impunity. Why the field artillery or someone did not have a 'crack' at the balloon was a question, which vexed many of the anti tankers. On the ground too the Japanese could be seen moving about in the foreground of the palace of the Sultan of Johore and at night there was considerable noise from the mainland as the Japanese prepared for the final onslaught across the Causeway. Occasionally the Japanese attempted to reconnoitre the allied defences and there was an instance of a Japanese party in a junk being surprised by an infantry patrol during the night. Such an alert always resulted in a series of flares and exchanges of machine gun fire between the Island and the mainland. |
